Federal Preemption of State Law Under the
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Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act' ("ERISA") in response to a perceived need for a uniform and
manageable solution to a problem of national magnitude and character. The restructuring of employee compensation from the basic
payment of cash wages to complex agreements of deferred compensation and casualty coverage 2 presented a new dilemma in labormanagement and employee relations: to provide reasonable assurances that promised benefits would be available when due. In addressing this issue, ERISA created a comprehensive regulatory
scheme directed at the displacement of state regulation of employee
benefit plans.
Determining the scope of ERISA's preemption of state law has
been a recurring problem in cases where state law purports to govern
some aspect of employee benefit plans. Questions of the extent of
federal preemption under ERISA necessarily implicate larger issues
concerning the proper relationship between state and federal law.
These questions have always been central in the continuing debate
over the nature of American federalism; 3 they are particularly relevant in this context since ERISA was enacted during a time of
renewed concern with the balance of state and federal power., Although the following discussion will briefly address the general issue
of federal preemption, the article's focus is on the specific problems
that have arisen with respect to preemption of state law by ERISA.
We conclude that Congress intended to preempt almost all state
t Member of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Bars.
tt Member of the District of Columbia and California Bars.
IPub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976))
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as ERISA].
2 See R. MCCAFFERY, MANAGING THE EMPLOYEE BENEFITs PROGRAM 7-17 (1972).
3 The scope of the clauses of the Constitution empowering Congress to make all laws
"necessary and proper" for executing its delegated powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and
declaring such federal enactments to be the "supreme law of the land," id., art. VI, were, in
the words of Alexander Hamilton, "the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation" against ratification. TE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton) 244 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
See, e.g., Note, The PreemptionDoctrine:Shifting Perspectives on Federalismand the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
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regulation of employee pension and welfare benefit plans, but that
courts have often defined the scope of preemption more narrowly
where preemption may create what appear to be undesirable regulatory lacunae or supersede state law in fields traditionally left to
state governance. We argue that this continued whittling away of
the preemptive reach of ERISA seriously threatens the regulatory
scheme devised by Congress, and that it is up to Congress, not the
courts, to narrow ERISA's preemption of state law where particular
policy reasons make such action appropriate.
Part I of the article discusses the history of federal regulation
of employee benefit plans and outlines the substantive provisions of
ERISA. Part II discusses preemption in general and under ERISA.
The following three parts focus upon the three interpretive issues
that, to date, have most often been raised in judicial decisions concerning the scope of preemption under ERISA: the definition of an
"employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA, the question of which
state laws are preempted because they "relate to" such a plan, and
the interpretation of the scope of the exceptions that Congress wrote
into ERISA's preemption provisions. The article then briefly examines the closely related question whether federal regulation of employee pension plans under the National Labor Relations Act
preempts state regulation of such plans. Finally, Part VII discusses
current proposals for legislative reform of ERISA.
I.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY

ACT OF 1974

The first pension plan in the United States was established in
1875;1 the use of such employee benefit plans has increased ever
since.' The most rapid growth of private pension plans, however, has
been a recent phenomenon. By the end of World War II, private
pension plans covered over 6.4 million workers and controlled over
$5.4 billion in assets; 7 at the end of 1977, the assets of private,
noninsured pension funds totaled approximately $181.5 billion.,
Although employee benefit plans-collectively and individually-came to control massive amounts of capital, their rapid prolif' D. ROTHMAN,

ESTABLISHING AND ADMINISTERING PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS AND

1 (1967) (the plan was established by the American Express Company).
, See generally D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 21-28 (1964); Norman,
Private Pensions:A Study of Vesting, Funding,and Integration,21 U. FLA. L. REv. 141, 14243 (1968).
1D. HOLLAND, PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS: PROJECTED GROWTH 2 (1966). See also Pfenningstorf & Kimball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State
TRUST FUNDS

Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 787, 787-88.
337 SEC STATISTICAL BULL., May, 1978, at 6-7. Assets of all private and public pension
funds were estimated to be $501.5 billion. Id. at 8.
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eration was not accompanied by a corresponding development in
applicable law.9 Regulation generally was confined to state law: law
developed through decisions and statutes I0 not uniquely adapted to
providing protection for participants in such plans. Growing awareness of employee benefit plan abuses and failures revealed the inadequacy of local regulation of plans that were frequently multistate
or national in scope." After several intermediate federal regulatory
schemes, Congress enacted ERISA 2 to provide comprehensive protection to participants in employee benefit plans. The need for
ERISA's broadly, preemptive framework can be understood only
against the background of prior regulation of employee benefit
plans.
A.

Regulation Before ERISA

1. Trust Law. The method frequently chosen to protect beneficiaries of employee benefit plans was the trust mechanism, 3 a
device traditionally committed to state governance. Alternatively,
employers might pay premiums to an insurance carrier that would
then become directly responsible for the provision of benefits. 4 Insurance regulation is also an area traditionally committed to regulation by state law. Prior to ERISA, therefore, pension and welfare
benefit plans were regulated by either the trust law of individual
states or state insurance regulations."5
Local regulation of multistate plans has inherent disadvantages..6 The very flexibility that made trust law adaptable to the
needs of employee benefit plans was also an important drawback to
its value as a regulatory scheme. The law of trusts, which has as a
principal purpose the administration of estates, allows trustees considerable freedom to shape the trusts they create and leaves policing
to ordinary judicial processes begun by trustees, fiduciaries, or beneficiaries. Under state law, the terms of the trust agreement gener'See Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 788.
' G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 7 (2d ed. 1965).
" See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF PENSION PLAN
TERMINATIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as JOINT STUDY].
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976)).
" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5) (1976).
"See text and notes at notes 138 & 149 infra.
IS S. REP. No. 1150, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972); Herbert, Investment Regulation and
Conflicts of Interest in Employer-ManagedPension Plans, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 127,
143 (1976).
" See note 11 supra.
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ally control,1 7 exculpatory clauses generally are effective,' 8 common
law standards of prudence do not override contrary provisions in the
plan documents,' 9 participants and beneficiaries are not entitled to
routine affirmative disclosure of detailed information about their
plans, and access to the courts can be costly and time consuming.
The law of trusts was thus ill-equipped to govern the complexities
of welfare and pension benefit plans.
2. FederalLegislation.The earliest federal intervention in the
regulation of employee benefit plans came through the income tax
laws. Two kinds of questions have been involved: first, whether
contributions by employers, employees, or both, should be taxed as
income to the employee or taxation deferred until the benefits are
distributed; second, whether employer contributions should be deductible by the employer when made or only-if at all-when distributed. The second question has been particularly relevant to the
problem of regulation because congressional taxation policy has allowed immediate deduction of contributions only if made to a "taxqualified" fund, one that does not remain completely under the
employer's control and is therefore not a potential tax-avoidance
device.
Prior to 1921, reasonable payments to retired employees were
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense if the
total compensation given the employee remained reasonable,
but the tax laws did not regulate pension plans as such. The
Revenue Acts of 1921,20 1926,21 1928,22 1938,23 and 194224 gradually
created a special regime for "qualified" plans that permitted beneficiaries to defer taxation of employers' pension fund contributions
until the time of distribution. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954
represented Congress's most extensive use of the revenue laws to
regulate employee benefit plans. Section 401(a)2 sets forth a series
of specific requirements for a plan to be "tax qualified." The plan
must be intended for the exclusive benefit of employees and their
11RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (1959).

IsId. § 222. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., lst Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 1 SuBCOMM.
ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 615 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA].
11RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959). See S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at

29.
2 Ch. 136, § 219, 42 Stat. 227,
21 Ch. 27, § 219, 44 Stat. 9, 32
- Ch. 852, § 165, 45 Stat. 791,
- Ch. 289, § 165, 52 Stat. 447,
Z4 Ch. 619, § 162, 56 Stat. 798,
2 I.R.C. § 401(a).

246 (1921).
(1926).
839 (1928).
518 (1938).
862 (1942).
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beneficiaries, 2 it may not discriminate in favor of shareholders, officers or highly compensated employees,2 it must cover a minimum
percentage of all employees,2 and it must meet minimum vesting
and termination rules. 2 Once an employer's plan is "qualified," the
employer may take immediate deductions for contributions to the
plan, 30 while the employee-participant (or his beneficiary) may
3
defer taxation of the proceeds until actually received. 1
In 1947, Congress enacted the first important piece of nontax
legislation relating to pension plans: the Taft-Hartley amendments
to the Labor-Management Relations Act 32 ("LMRA"). Congress was

not primarily concerned with pension plans as such, but rather
sought to remedy a variety of labor-management problems, including what it perceived as abuses and corruption in labor unions.
Section 302 of LMRA3 required that unions maintaining employee
benefit plans hold contributed funds in trust,34 that the use of both
principal and income of the funds be restricted to the benefit of the
employees and their families, 5 that the funds be jointly administered by equal numbers of representatives of management and labor
pursuant to a written plan, 36 and that pension funds be kept
in a
37
separate pension trust segregated from other benefit trusts.
Regulation through the Internal Revenue Code and LMRA
proved inadequate in several respects. LMRA covered only certain
plans in unionized industries and imposed only a few specific requirements. The Internal Revenue Code provided more protection,
but could be avoided by employers willing to forego the tax benefits
accompanying "tax-qualified" plans. Most importantly, neither
LMRA nor the Revenue Code provided more than rudimentary tools
for the enforcement of fiduciary obligations against persons in control of employee benefit plans.
In 1958, Congress finally enacted legislation dealing exclusively
with employee benefit plans. By this time, almost 80 million persons
" Id. § 401(a)(2). The IRS has construed the "exclusive benefit" rule liberally, permitting plans wide latitude in determining recipients of plan benefits.
" Id. § 401(a)(4).
21Id. § 401(a)(3).
21 Id. § 401(a)(7)-(8).
" Id. § 404(a)(1).
" Id. § 402(a)(1). Additionally, income to the beneficiary may, in some circumstances,
be taxed at more favorable capital gains rates. Id. § 402(a)(2).
32 Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947).
29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
Id. § 186(c)(5)(A).
"Id.
3Id.
§ 186(c)(5)(B).
" Id. § 186(c)(5)(C).
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were covered by over one million plans holding assets of approximately $30 billion." Weighing the financial burdens imposed by the
administrative requirements of a regulatory program against the
need to protect plan beneficiaries, Congress decided to rely on disclosure and reporting to reveal improprieties and to continue to
depend on state law for substantive regulation. In recommending
enactment of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 195831
("WPPDA"), the House Committee ofi Education and Labor made
clear the limited federal role intended under this act:
[WPPDA] is designed to place the primary responsibility for
the policing and improved operations of these plans upon the
participants and beneficiaries themselves, with a minimum of
interference in the natural development and operation of such
plans, reserving to the States the detailed regulationsrelating
to insurance and trusts, and other phases of their operations,
and to place the least possible burden by way of cost and otherwise upon the plans and the taxpayers in general."
The federal role under WPPDA was limited to requiring disclosure and filing of information. The Act required administrators' of
plans with twenty-five or more participants to publish 2 and file
with the Secretary of Labor 3 a description of the plan with information on plan administration, benefit schedules, sources of financing,
relationship-if any-to a collective bargaining agreement, and
claims procedures. 4 Additionally, plans with 100 or more participants were required to publish and file annual reports disclosing
amounts contributed by each employer, amounts of benefits paid,
a statement of assets specifying the form in which they were held,
and costs of plan administration. " Aside from these specific provisions, as the Supreme Court stressed in Malone v. White Motor
Corp.," "[WPPDA] together with the legislative history of the 1958
3 H.R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4181, 4187. The growth of benefit trusts has been spurred by the decision
of the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949), that employee retirement and pension plans are a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining under Taft-Hartley.
n Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1976).
' H.R. REP. No. 2283, supra note 38, at 10, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4189 (emphasis added).
" Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 5(b), 72 Stat. 999 (1958) (repealed 1976).
4 Id. § 8, 72 Stat. 999 (1958) (repealed 1976).
"Id. § 8(b), 72 Stat. 1002 (1958) (repealed 1976).
4 Id. § 6(b), 72 Stat. 999 (1958) (repealed 1976).
Id. § 7(b), 72 Stat. 1000 (1958) (repealed 1976).
" 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
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Act, clearly indicate that Congress at the time recognized and pre4 7
served state authority to regulate pension plans.
Underlying WPPDA was faith not only in state regulation, but
in the ability of employees to negotiate adequate safeguards through
collective bargaining and, with the help of laws requiring reporting
and disclosure and prohibiting the most egregious forms of selfdealing and misappropriation, to police the resulting agreements for
themselves. Theoretically, federal and state criminal statutes provided some protection against employee benefit plan abuses. The
availability of criminal sanctions for theft,48 embezzlement," false
statement, 0 and bribery,' was not, however, an effective deterrent.
The difficulty in meeting the greater burden of proof necessary in a
criminal action, combined with the procedural protections afforded
criminal defendants, meant that few were indicted and fewer convicted.2 Moreover, criminal convictions have no remedial effect
since they do not necessarily restore lost plan assets or alter imprudent practices and policies. Finally, many abuses, such as inadequate funding and vesting requirements, or improvidert administration, do not come under the ban of the criminal law at all.
Despite the panoply of state and federal laws appearing to regulate employee benefit plans, prior to 1974 participants and beneficiaries were in fact afforded few governmental guarantees that benefits would be available when promised. The basic misconception
that undermined each of Congress's efforts was its premise that
protection could be assured through minimal reporting and disclosure requirements and specific prohibitions of the most egregious
forms of self-dealing and misappropriation, while leaving the imposition of substantive standards to state discretion. In recommending
enactment of comprehensive federal regulation of employee benefit
plans in 1972, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
acknowledged that WPPDA, the most extensive attempt to regulate
benefit plans, had not achieved what its sponsors had hoped:
,Id. at 505.
18 U.S.C. § 664 (1976).
" Id.
'
Id. § 1027. This section now applies to the reporting and disclosure requirements of
ERISA. See id.
" Id. § 1954. This section now applies to ERISA. See id.
52 According to one congressional study, only nine persons were indicted and six convicted for theft and embezzlement violations involving benefit plans in 1971; another sixteen
persons were convicted under the bribery statute. S. RaP. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 95
(1972). See United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
953 (1971); United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
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Experience. . . has demonstrated the inadequacy of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in regulating the private
pension system. It is weak in its limited disclosure requirements and wholly lacking in substantive fiduciary standards.
Its chief procedural weakness can be found in its reliance upon
the initiative of the individual employee to police the manage3
ment of his plan.1
The Committee's last criticism applied as well to many of the other
state and federal laws regulating aspects of employee pension and
welfare benefit plans. 4 It was against this backdrop of ineffective
federal and state regulation that Congress in 1974 enacted a comprehensive scheme for regulating employee benefit plans.
B.

The 1974 Act

ERISA substituted mandatory federal standards for "the initiative of the individual employee." It did not do so across the board,
however. Although all of the provisions of ERISA apply to pension
plans, welfare plans need only comply with the reporting and disclosure provisions and observe the Act's fiduciary standards." In passing ERISA, Congress implemented its intent to protect participants
in employee benefit plans by establishing standards of fiduciary
conduct, requiring disclosure and reporting of financial information,
providing minimum funding and vesting standards, requiring plan
termination insurance, and providing appropriate remedies enforceable in the federal courts. These detailed regulatory and remedial
provisions cut across the full spectrum of subject matter previously
regulated by prior state and federal law.
1. Participation,Vesting, and Funding Standards.The enactment of ERISA strengthened, to varying degrees, the participation,
vesting, and funding requirements for pension plans. ERISA left
largely intact the tax qualification standards of section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code" and retained the Code's requirements of
minimum eligibility and participation percentages. 57 It did add to
this minimum participation rule a minimum age and service requirement: generally every employee twenty-five years or older
S. REP. No. 1150, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
See Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 793-96.
" ERISA §§ 201(l), 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a)(1) (1976).
"I.R.C. § 401(a).
v Id. § 410(a). See Chadwick, ERISA's Minimum Participationand Vesting Standards,

in 17

TEXTBOOK FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFrr PLAN TRusTEES, ADmiNsTRATORs AND ADVISORS: PRO-

CEEDINGS OF THE

1975

ANNUAL EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF

EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

3 [hereinafter cited as 1975 TExTBooK].
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must be eligible for plan participation after completing one year of
service.5 8 Prior to ERISA, employers were not required to provide
vested (nonforfeitable) rights to employees except as were required
to qualify under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." With
the enactment of ERISA, qualified plans must provide complete
vesting of all accrued benefits derived from an employee's contributions, of normal retirement benefits when the employee reaches normal retirement age, and of all accrued benefits derived from the
employer's contributions." With respect to the funding of pension
plans, prior standards under the Internal Revenue Code required
only that employers make contributions to defined-benefit pensions
plans sufficient to pay normal pension costs based on actuarial calculations plus accrued interest on unfunded past-service liabilities.
ERISA added to these rules a requirement that contributions be
sufficient to amortize past-service liabilities" and that experience
2
losses be taken into account in establishing minimum funding.
2. Termination Insurance. Title IV of ERISA established the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 3 ("PBGC"), a government
corporation within the Department of Labor,64 to ensure that participants and their beneficiaries receive at least partial benefits from
tax-qualified defined-benefit plans that terminate with insufficient
assets to meet plan liabilities." Upon termination of a covered plan,
I.R.C. § 410(ai(1)(A).
Id. § 401(a)(7).
" Id. § 411(a). Vesting must be under one of three alternative schemes: (1) full vesting
after ten years of service, (2) full vesting after fifteen years on a prescribed graduated schedule, or (3) full vesting under the "rule of 45," which requires fifty percent vesting when the
sum of the age of the employee and years of service equal 45, plus ten percent for each of the
next five years. Id. See Chadwick, supra note 57; Slaughter, ERISA: Administrative Implementation of Participation,Vesting and Benefit Accrual, in 1975 TxTBooK, supra note 57,
at 24.
" I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B). See generally 18 TExTBOOK FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN TRusTEES, ADMINISTRATORS AND ADvIsoRS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1976 ANNUAL EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 159-89 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 TEXTBOOK].
£2 I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(iv)-(v). See Brownlee, Dealing with ERISA's Funding
Requirements, in 1975 TEXTBOOK, supranote 57, at 53. Qualified plans are required to set up
"funding standard accounts," I.R.C. § 412(b)(1), see Gayda, The Funding Standard Account: What It Means and How It Works, in 1976 TEXTBOOK, supra note 61, at 164, in order
to determine at the end of each year whether the employer has an "accumulated funding
deficiency." I.R.C. § 412(a).
0 ERISA § 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976).
" 31 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
" ERISA § 4002(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) (1976). Pension plans that are tax qualified
under section 401(a) of the Code, or have fulfilled the requirements of section 401(a) for the
preceding five years are within the coverage of PBGC. ERISA § 4021(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a)
(1976).
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participants are insured for the actuarial equivalent of the lesser of
the employee's highest average monthly wage over any five year
period of participation or $750 per month." Employers whose plans
terminate may be required to reimburse PBGC for benefit payments
despite earlier payment of insurance premiums to PBGC. 7
3. Reporting and Disclosure. Although ERISA repealed the
WPPDA, 5 the new Act again imposed substantial reporting requirements on administrators of both pension and welfare benefit plans."
Plans must publish and file with the Secretary of Labor an annual
report"0 including a financial statement prepared by an independent
certified public accountant,71 and plans subject to the new vesting
rules must file an annual registration statement with the Secretary
of the Treasury72 to inform the Internal Revenue Service of participants with deferred vested benefits who are no longer employed by
the plan sponsor.7 3 In addition to notifying these government agencies, plan administrators must provide participants with summary
plan descriptions and annual reports74 and must give plan
participants with deferred vested benefits individual statements
showing the amount, nature, and form of vested benefits upon ter75
mination of their employment.
4. Fiduciary Standards. Prior to the enactment of ERISA,
state laws governed the conduct of employee benefit plan fiduciaries. These laws generally required them to exercise such skill as a
man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property.76 Section 404 of ERISA modified the common-law
- Id. § 4022(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (1976).
- Id. § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976). Employers maintaining single employer pension
plans may be liable for the lesser of the full current value of benefits guaranteed by the Act
less the current value of plan assets or thirty percent of the employer's net worth. Id. §
4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1976).
" Id. § 111(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1976).
" Moore & Berger, Reporting and Disclosure under ERISA, 45 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 103
(1976); Schwedt, Reporting and Disclosure: The DOL Component, in 1976 TEXTBOOK, supra
note 61, at 74; Stevens, Reporting and Recordkeeping as a FiduciaryDuty, in id. at 115. See
generally id. at 115-55.
" ERISA § 103(a)(1)(A), 104(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023(a)(1)(A), 1024(a) (1976).
Id. § 103(a)(1)(B)(i), 103(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023(a)(1)(B)(i), 1023(a)(3)(A)

(1976).
"2 I.R.C. § 6057(a)(1).
n See 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 5099 KK (1978). The statement must provide
the name of the plan, the name and address of the plan administrator, the name and taxpayer-identifying number of participants leaving the service of the employer and entitled to
vested deferred benefits, and the nature, amount and form of the benefit. I.R.C. § 6057(a)
(2).
,' ERISA §§ 102, 104(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024(b) (1976).
, Id. § 105(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(c) (1976); I.R.C. § 6057(e).
" See Hutchinson, The FederalPrudent Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 VIL. L. Rnv. 15,
26 (1976); Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting a PotentialPensioner's Pension-An
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prudent-man rule somewhat to require fiduciaries of pension and
welfare benefit plans to administer plans "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims."77 Moreover, the Act requires fiduciaries to administer plans "solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and
. . . for the exclusive purpose of. . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and. . . defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."78 In aid of this standard of conduct,
ERISA requires that employee benefit plans be administered in
trust form79 pursuant to a written document providing for one or
more named fiduciaries." The Act also requires fiduciaries of a plan
to adhere to plan documents and to diversify the investments of the
plan to minimize the risk of large losses,' imposes liability for the
breach of these standards as well as for certain breaches by cofiduciaries, 2 and proscribes fiduciaries from causing the plan to engage
in "prohibited transactions" with a party in interest.1
5. Enforcement. To implement its substantive provisions,
ERISA contains specific administrative, civil and criminal enforceOverview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 40
BROOKLYN L. REv. 521, 529-34 (1974); Note, FiduciaryStandards and the Prudent Man Rule
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HAv. L. Rav. 960 (1975).
17ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1976). Seegenerally 1976TExTBOOK,
supra note 61, at 3-58; Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 76, at 562-78; Gertner,
Fiduciary Liability Under ERISA: A Review and a Preview, in 19 TEXTBOOK FOR EmPLOYEE
BENETr PLAN TRusTEEs, ADMINISTRAToRS

AND ADvIsORs: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1977 ANNuAL

OF EMrLOYEE BENEFIT PLANs 37,
39-40 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 TEXTBOOK]; Silverman, ERISA's Prudent Man, id.
at 44.
11ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
n Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976).
" Id. § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1976). See Engroff, UnderstandingPlan and
Trust Documents, in 1977 TEXTBOOK, supra note 77, at 83. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21)(A) (1976), designates as a "fiduciary" to a plan each person who exercises discretionary authority or control respecting plan management, administration, or disposition of assets,
EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

or who renders investment advice for remuneration. The Department of Labor, with the IRS's

concurrence, amplified this definition of "fiduciary" in an interpretive bulletin. 40 Fed. Reg.
47,491 (1975).
," ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976).
n Id. § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976).
13Id. 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (1976). The Secretary of Labor may grant exemptions from prohibited transactions under procedures established pursuant to authority
granted by Congress in ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1976). 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1975);
Rev. Proc. 75-26, 1975-1 C.B. 722. See also Chadwick, Prohibited Transactionsand Office
Space Leases: The Final Regulations and Exemptions, in 1977 TEXTBOOK, supra note 77, at
61; Reagan, ProhibitedTransactionsUnder ERISA, in 1975 TEXTBOOK, supra note 57, at 414;
Retzack, In Search of an Exemption: One Union's Experience, in 1976 TExTBOOK, supra note
61, at 50-52.
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ment provisions. 4 Responsibility for enforcing the civil remedial
provisions of the Act lies with the Departments of Labor and the
Treasury;s criminal actions are initiated by the Secretary of Labor
and prosecuted by the Justice Department." The Secretary of Labor
may bring civil actions to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty, to seek
equitable relief for violations of the Act, and to obtain damages for
violations of the participation, vesting, and funding requirements of
ERISAY In addition, any participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may
institute a civil action to compel disclosure of information required
by the Act,88 to enjoin a violation of the plan or the Act, 89 or to seek
relief for the plan administrator's failure to comply with the Act's
reporting requirements. 0 To enforce these civil remedies, ERISA
establishes federal jurisdiction 1 and provides for2suits and enforcement of judgments against the plans as entities.
II.

ERISA

AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

In enacting ERISA in 1974, Congress provided the first comprehensive federal regulation of private employee benefit plans. Since
state law had previously regulated many aspects of such plans,
ERISA involved not only the creation of new law but the displacement of a large body of existing state law. The extent of that dis" ERISA §§ 501-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1144 (1976). The White House Reorganization
Plan No. 4, transmitted to Congress on August 10, 1978, and to be effective on or before April
30, 1979, has reallocated responsibilities between the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury.
43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978). Senators Williams and Javits would go farther in their proposed
ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, and consolidate administration of ERISA in a new government agency. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 401-404 (1979). See 125 CONG. REC. 570, 57172 (1979) (Sen. Javits's statement on the Senate Floor); text and notes at notes 324-328 infra.
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1976), and in scattered sections
" See ERISA tit. III
of 26 U.S.C.).
u Id. § 506, 29 U.S.C. § 1136 (1976).
8 Id. § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1976). See Hutchinson, ERISA's Regulations
and Fiduciary Responsibility: Keeping the Purpose in Mind, in 1975 TEXTBOOK, supra note
57, at 354.
u ERISA §§ 502(a)(1), 502(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1), 1132(c) (1976).
n Id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1976).
" Id. § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (1976).
" Id. § 502(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1976).
"2 Id. §§ 502(d)(1), 502(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(d)(1), 1132(2) (1976). Section 502(d)(2)
provides that money judgments "under this title" are enforceable only against the plan and
not against the plan fiduciaries, unless there is an independent ground for individual liability.
Plan trustees may, however, be individually liable under state common law for the contractual obligations of a plan.
ERISA also permits the court to award attorneys' fees in a suit by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. Id. § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976). See Hutchinson & Pagash,
Awarding Attorneys Fees Under ERISA, 1 CoRP. L. REv. 195 (1978); Hutchinson, Attorney's
Fees Under ERISA: When, and Against Whom?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 1979, at 25.
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placement, the scope of federal "preemption" of state law in the
field of private employee benefit plans, is the focus of the remainder
of this article.
A.

The Preemption Doctrine

Under the supremacy clause, congressional exercise of 9a3
granted power may supersede state regulation in the same area.
This means, at the very least, that state law is unenforceable when
it conflicts in its terms with valid federal law." Federal law need not
impose substantive regulation to be preemptive, however. Congress
may determine that a field under its regulatory control should be
free of all regulation, state or federal, and legislate accordingly.9 5
When there is no direct conflict between state and federal law,
two questions arise: To what extent does federal activity in an area
preclude the states from imposing nonconflicting regulations in the
same area, and how broadly is the area "occupied by Congress" to
be defined? In principle, the answers to both questions normally
turn on congressional intent. The mere existence of federal activity
will not necessarily eliminate all state governmental functions in the
same area. Indeed, the opposite is the normal presumption:
"Federal law is generally interstitial in nature. . . .Congress acts
: . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states
in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background
of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation."" Nevertheless, Congress need not express preemptive intent
explicitly for courts to find that a federal statute preempts state law.
A state regulation is preempted when it conflicts with a proper
," U.S. Cosrs. art. VI, cl. 2. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

CONSTITUTIONAL

127-34 (9th ed. 1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAw §§ 6-24 to -28, at 376-94
(1978).
" "Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in the same field
nevertheless override state laws with which they conflict." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (citations omitted).
,1One commentator has characterized the preemption issue as follows: "Preemption
problems arise whenever a state law is asserted to be unenforceable because it is contrary to
a federal law, as when the state commands conduct which the federal law forbids, or when
the federal government forbids state regulation of a field of activity subject to federal superintendence." Hirsch, Toward a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. IM.L.F. 515, 516.
" P. BATOR, P. MISHKiN, D. SHAPIRo, & H. WEcHsLER, HART & WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL
CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973). There is also a minority view of the
doctrinal basis of the preemption which holds that preemption only occurs when the states
are unable to regulate the subject matter that is the source of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalismand the Concept of Preemption,21 DE PAUL L.
REv. 630 (1972). The cases generally have not treated subject matter as an independent
ground for preemption, but only as one factor in determining congressional intent. See Note,
supra note 4, at 625.
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exercise of federal power or interferes with a federal system of regulation. 7 Nor is a direct collision between state and federal law necessary, although courts are to infer Congress's preemptive intent from
the structure of a statute or its legislative history only where the
intent is "unmistakeable." 5 Structure and legislative history are
not unambiguous guides to statutory interpretation, but even when
Congress does make it explicit that state law is preempted, courts
still may have to examine the statute's structure and history to
determine the precise boundaries of the preempted field. Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that decisions on preemption have an ad hoc quality, 9 even though the Supreme Court has
tried to explain its approach to preemption in a principled way.'00
There are, however, underlying factors that help to explain the
trend of decisions. Where state law is preempted, those matters not
regulated by federal law in the preempted field may go completely
unregulated. Although in the past courts often interpreted federal
preemption broadly, more recently, with the decline in laissez-faire
attitudes and the emergence of more general acceptance of government regulation, courts have tended towards an increased tolerance
of state legislation that supplements federal action.' 0 ' In addition,
11See Hart, The Relations Between Federal and State Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 51725 (1954).

" The Court summarized this doctrine in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963):
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of
commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of
persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
Id. at 142.
" Note, supra note 4, at 625. One commentator observed that "cases involving preemption of state law by federal statutes have often produced considerable confusion and criticism." Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 363 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
Another commentator attempted to synthesize the various considerations used by the
Supreme Court in determining whether a state law has been preempted by federal legislation.
These factors include:
whether the statute expressly bars state regulation of a subject; whether the scheme
of federal regulation is so pervasive that it leaves no room for state action; whether the
statute touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal law
must preclude enforcement of state law; whether the object sought to be obtained by
the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it reveal the same
purpose; and finally, whether the federal law governs a field where the need for national
uniformity is so great that divergent state laws cannot be tolerated.
Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L.
Rev. 57, 95 (1976).
'" See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
"
See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); L. TamE, supra note 93, § 6-24, at 379. The trend toward a
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there is discernible in some decisions a reluctance to expand the
scope of national law to a point of undermining the authority of
state government.
Two recent cases illustrate this trend most strikingly. In
National League of Cities v. Usery,1"" the Court struck down the
1974 amendments10

3

to the Fair Labor Standards Act"'4 that ex-

tended its substantive provisions to employees of the government of
a state or one of its political subdivisions.'0 5 The Court asserted that
such extension of federal standards would "interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty,' '0 6 observing that if Congress
could preempt the states' authority to make fundamental employment decisions "there would be little left of the States' ' "separate
and independent existence."' "0, Even where congressional author-

ity is unquestioned, the Court has been loath to find preemptive
intent in fields in which states have traditionally played an important role and have continuing responsibilities. In New York State
Department of Social Services v. Dublino,'18 the Court held that
work requirements imposed by New York as a condition for receipt
of federal welfare funds were not preempted by a federal program
designed to achieve the very same ends. Justice Powell, writing an
opinion joined by six other members of the Court, stressed that the
Court should hesitate to invalidate compatible state regulations
absent the express intent of Congress to exercise its article VI power.
He concluded that holding the federal program to be the sole
method of imposing work incentives "could impair the capacity of
the state government to deal effectively with the critical problem of
mounting welfare costs and the increasing financial dependency of
many of its citizens," and he stressed the beneficence of a "scheme
of cooperative federalism" to achieve the desired end.' 9
In cases such as Dublino, the Court appears to go beyond a
mere inquiry into congressional intent or into whether the state law
interferes with the federal regulatory scheme. Rather, absent explicit preemption by Congress or clear incompatibility of state and
moderate approach to the preemption doctrine may be a product of the present Court's
generally restrained view of federal power. See Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied
Federal PreemptionDoctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 307-09 (1977).
182426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1" Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
I
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
,B Id. §§ 203(d), 203(x) (1976).
,B 426 U.S. at 849.
"7Id. at 851.
413 U.S. 405 (1973).
, Id. at 413.
"'
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federal laws, the Court has apparently been willing to risk a certain
amount of interference with a federal system of regulation if the
state interest is sufficiently strong, so long as the federal scheme is
not completely disrupted."'
In 1973, in Goldstein v. California,"' the Court held that a
state's right to prohibit the unauthorized reproduction of phonograph records was not preempted by the mere existence of a federal
copyright statute that had long been interpreted as not regulating
2
such reproduction. Similarly, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,"
the Court held that a state trade-secret law could protect the secrecy
of inventions not covered by federal patent law. In both cases, the
Court rejected the argument that the freedom to copy published
material or to use inventions not protected by federal law was itself
part of the federal regulatory scheme. Nor was the Court swayed by
the possibility that inconsistent state regulations would create some
interference with the exercise of federal power. In Kewanee, for
example, the Court asked whether state protection would "cause a
substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would not
seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection."" 3 Finding no risk of such major disruption of the federal scheme, the Court
upheld the state regulation.
The approach taken by the Court in these cases alters, subtly
but significantly, the literal and traditional reading of the supremacy clause. The proper judicial inquiry is whether Congress intended to preempt state law pursuant to a delegated power. This
should be accomplished through statutory construction aided by
legislative history, not by a balancing of competing federal and state
policy objectives. It is from this point of view that the following
discussion examines federal preemption under ERISA.
B.

ERISA's Preemption of State Law

Both the statutory language of ERISA and its legislative history
make clear that Congress intended to occupy comprehensively the
field of employee benefit plan regulation." 4 Section 514(a) of ERISA
expressly states that, except for the provisions of section 514(b), the
, Note, supra note 4, at 649-53.
' 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
112416 U.S. 470 (1974).
11

Id. at 489.

"I See generally Shepard, ERISA in the Context of FederalPre-emption: The Legislative

Background, in 1976 TExTBooK, supra note 61, at 452; Blomquist, Rebutting the NAIC Position Against Pre-emption of State Laws by ERISA, in id. at 457; Pantos, PreemptionLitigation Under ERISA, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 336 (1978); Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7,
at 800-09.
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provisions of titles I and IV "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan" within the jurisdiction of section 4(a) of ERISA."5 This broad
preemptive language is tempered only somewhat by several limiting
exceptions. Section 514(b)(1) provides that the broad preemptive
effect of section 514(a) does not apply to causes of action arising
before January 1, 1975;11 section 514(d) provides a savings clause
for other federal laws."1 7 Most significant of the exceptions to section
514(a) is section 514(b)(2)(A), which provides a savings clause for
state regulation of insurance, banking or securities." 8 To prevent
this clause from evolving into a large loophole through the characterization of benefit plans as insurance, section 514(b)(2)(B) expressly prohibits such characterization."' Finally, section 514(b)(4)
exempts from the broad preemptive scope of section 514(a) "any
generally applicable criminal law of a State."'' 0
The conference committee that adopted the sweeping language
of section 514(a) made clear in its report that it intended the
preemptive scope of the section to be broad:
[T]he provisions of Title I are to supersede all State laws that
relate to any employee benefit plan that is established by an
employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an
employee organization that represents employees engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce ....
The preemption provisions of Title I are not to exempt any
person from any State law that regulates insurance, banking,
or securities. However, the substitute [language] generally
provides that an employee benefit plan is not to be considered
as an insurance company, bank, trust company or investment
company (and is not to be considered as engaged in the business of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law that
regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
2
trust companies, or investment companies.' '
"2 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
"I 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1976). See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978);
Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976).
,, Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
' Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).

'e Id. § 1144(b)(4).

"2 S. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974).
The Conference Committee's intent to include a broad preemption provision is further
evidenced by its consideration and rejection of the portion of the Administration's recommendations to the conferees concerning section 514. The Administration summarized the substi-
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The report stated that the statute made an exception only for plans
"established primarily to provide death benefits," which were to
continue to be regulated under state insurance law and other applicable state law. Moreover, during the final debates on ERISA, its
broad preemptive scope was emphasized in both the Senate and the
House. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., stressed that preemption was necessary to eliminate "the threat of conflicting or incon' 22
sistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.'
This, he explained, meant that "all actions of State or local governments" having the effect of law were to be preempted.2 3
Preemption had strong bipartisan support. The senior Republican member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Senator Jacob Javits, said:
In view of Federal preemption, state laws compelling disclosure from private welfare or pension plans, imposing fiduciary requirements on such plans, imposing criminal penalties
on failure to contribute to plans-unless a criminal statute of
general application-establishing State termination insurance
programs, et cetera, will be superseded. It is also intended that
a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
24
under private welfare and pension plans.
Senator Javits explained that the conference had opted for such
broad preemption to avoid the dangers feared from earlier Senate
and House versions of the bill, which had more narrowly defined the
perimeters of preemption only "in relation to the areas regulated by
the bill":
Such a formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation
tute language as follows:
The Administration has prepared a preemption clause . . . which makes explicit the
areas of state law to be preempted. They are as follows: participation, vesting, funding,
disclosure and fiduciary standards, portability, termination insurance, enforcement and
additional plan requirements (as set out in House bill Section 1021 which includes joint
and survivor annuity requirements and provisions against alienation of benefits). The
preemption section should make clear that a state could not set minimum standards for
retirement plans in the areas listed above; however, it could regulate the tax aspects of
retirement plans.
Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees of H.R. 2 to Provide
for Pension reform, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIV HisToaY op ERISA, supra note 18, at 5145.
22 120 CONG. R c. 29,933 (1974),
' Id.
IU1 Id. at 29,942.
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over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal
regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some
particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not
clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme ....
[C]omprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the
interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State
action in the field of private employee benefit programs.'2
Senator Javits also made it clear that the conferees were aware that
such broad preemption might create regulatory lacunae or lead to
other, unforeseen problems. They chose, however, not to limit the
scope of preemption, but to entrust to a watchdog body the task of
recommending new legislation as needed. The conferees, he said,
recognized the broad dimensions of ERISA's preemption provisions
and determined that the Congressional Pension Task Force should
evaluate their effects. If the Task Force found that ERISA was
Congress could
precluding essential state or federal legislation,
2 6
make "appropriate modifications" in the statute.
Congressman John Dent, the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee, explained
and defended preemption in similar terms on the floor of the House.
"The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, applied this principle [preemption] in its broadest sense to
foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans."'
They did this to eliminate "the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."' Congressman Dent stressed that
reserving "to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field
of employee benefit plans" was "to many the crowfing achievement
of this legislation.''
That ERISA's structure, language, and legislative history support a broad interpretation of the scope of federal preemption of
state law in this field has not been seriously questioned by many.
Federal district courts generally have concluded that "federal
preemption in the area of pensions and other employee benefit programs is virtually total."'' 0 In a particularly thoughtful opinion,
U

Id.

12,Id. See text and notes at notes 324-339 infra.
121120 CONG. REc. at 29,197 (1974).
12 Id.

1 Id.
"

Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D. Kan. 1977). See

also Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard
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Judge Renfrew of the District Court of the Northern District for
California, after examining the legislative history of section 514,
concluded that "Congress carefully considered the question of
preemption, including the feasibility of enacting a more limited
preemption provision, and . . .ultimately enacted section 514(a)
with the express purpose of summarily preempting state regulation
of ERISA-covered employee benefit plans."'' 1
Opinion letters issued by the Department of Labor have also
interpreted the legislative history of section 514 as indicating a congressional intent to occupy the field. One such letter concluded by
referring to the remarks of Senator Williams on the Senate floor:
The major reasons for broad preemption disclosed in these
remarks are (1) the need to prevent conflicting regulation over
interstate plans, (2) the desire to avoid the litigation that
would result from piecemeal preemption, (3) the emergence of
a pervasive Federal interest in employee benefit plans, and (4)
the existence of a comprehensive federal program for further

study .... 132
Nevertheless, in spite of such general agreement on the preemptive
scope of section 514, courts have begun to carve out exceptions to
it, and both the administrative agencies and congressional committees have occasionally supported or acquiesced in these decisions.
There is a natural tendency to restrict the scope of preemption
where it appears to produce an inequitable result in a particular
case. Equally important, since ERISA regulates only reporting and
fiduciary standards in the case of welfare benefit plans, and since
Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note
7, at 801.
"3 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The
testimony heard by Congress regarding federal preemption cited in Hewlett-Packard
included: Proposed Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 5741
before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1968) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director,* Department of
Legislation, AFL-CIO); ProposedRevisions of the Welfare and PensionPlansDisclosureAct:
Hearings on H.R. 2 & H.R. 462 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 315 (1973) (statement of Preston C.
Basset on behalf of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.); id., pt. 2, at 651 (statement of
Lauren Upson, Member, California Banker's Association Committee on Employee Benefit
Trusts); id., pt. 1, at 554-55 (statement of Robert D. Haase, Commissioner of Insurance, State
of Wisconsin); id., pt. 2, at 188-95 (statement of Stanley C. Du Rose, Jr., Commissioner of
Insurance of the State of Wisconsin). See also text and notes at notes 292-320 infra.
132 Department of Labor Opinion Letter 75-130 (July 18, 1975). See also Department of
Labor Opinion Letter 76-90 (July 14, 1976); Department of Labor Opinion Letter 76-84 (June
22, 1976); Department of Labor Opinion Letter 75-143 (October 30, 1975); Department of
Labor Opinion Letter 75-135 (October 15, 1975).
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employee benefit plans intersect with many areas traditionally left
to state governance, there is tension between the broad preemption
intended by Congress when it enacted ERISA and the recent tendency of the courts to restrict the scope of federal preemption where
it threatens to create a regulatory vacuum or where it interferes with
state regulation of a field traditionally left to state control.

III. WHAT IS A PLAN?
In enacting ERISA, Congress did not intend to preempt state
regulation of every conceivable arrangement promising future benefits to employees. Regardless of the ultimate scope of section 514,
state law affecting an employee benefit program is not preempted
if the program is not a "plan" within the meaning of section 3 of
ERISA.'3 3 Difficult line-drawing questions have arisen with regard
to benefit packages marketed by insurance companies or other entrepreneurs, in whose management neither employers nor employees participate to any significant extent. A broad reading of section
3 would cover such a plan if it is "established" or "maintained" by
an employer, employee organization, or both, and would use the
definition of "employer" in section 3(5), which includes "any person
acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an
ERISA defines employee benefit plans as follows:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund,
or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or daycare centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in section 186(C) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or
death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
(2) The terms "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method
of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from
the plan.
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.
ERISA § 3(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1976).
ERISA section 4 specifies which of the plans within the definition of section 3 are within
the coverage of title I of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1976).
'3
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employer" as well as "a group or association of employers. 1 ' 34
Courts, however, have sometimes given section 3 a more restrictive
interpretation, especially when upholding state regulation of multiple employer trusts.
Multiple Employer Trusts

A.

Multiple employer trusts, which have experienced rapid growth
since the enactment of ERISA, 35 enable employers of small numbers of employees to pool their resources in order to provide welfare
benefits similar to those offered by larger employers.'3 6 Typically,
these trusts are organized and managed by a third-party administrator who may be an agent for an insurance company or an independent organization. The plans may be self-funded, insured by
37
independent carriers, or self-funded in part and insured in part.
The central question is whether a multiple employer trust is a
variety of insurance or an employee benefit plan under section 3 of
ERISA. Regulation of insurance is a matter that has been committed to the states by Congress under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 138
In addition, insurance plans, if they are not "employee benefit
plans," are excluded from the scope of preemption by the savings
29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1976).
According to testimony offered by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) before an ERISA oversight hearing held by the House Labor Subcommittee on
Labor Standards, an estimated 600,000 persons are participants in self-funding multiple
employer trusts ("METs") operated by at least 30 MET organizations. NAIC further estimated that these plans collect over $300 million each year and that over $3 million worth of
pensions are currently receiving welfare benefits from uninsured funds.
NAIC charged that these contributions are often mismanaged or expended on administrative costs, including excessive commissions, leading to insolvency. According to NAIC, at
least five uninsured METs became insolvent between January 1977 and June 1978. Oversight
on ERISA, 1978: Hearings on Public Law 93-406 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards
of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 658-59 (statement of National
Association of Insurance Commissioners by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA
Preemption Task Force) [hereinafter cited as NAIC Statement].
,3 Multiple employer trusts should not be confused with "multiemployer" trusts or plans
that are established between a labor union and more than one employer pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. ERISA § 3(37), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (1976). See T.D. 7552,
43 Fed. Reg. 29,939-42 (1978) (IRS definition of multiemployer plan).
,37Fletcher, Preemption and the Multiple Employer Trust (MET) Problem, in 1977
TEXTBOOK, supra note 77, at 71, 73. See generally Tomar, ERISA: Boon or Bane for SelfFunded Welfare Plans, in 1975 TEXTBOOK, supra note 57, at 374.
'' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). Section 1011 provides:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part
of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation
of such business by the several States.
Id. § 1011. Section 1012(b) provides that no federal law shall be construed to preempt a state
insurance law "unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."
"3

1'
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clause of section 514(b)(2)(A). 3 9 Even before the enactment of
ERISA, there were substantial questions regarding the method and
extent of state regulation of self-insured benefit plans.4 0 After
ERISA took effect, administrators of some multiple employer trusts
took the position that such trusts are immune from state regulation
because they are employee benefit plans under exclusive federal
jurisdiction."' The consequence of this argument would be a potential regulatory vacuum since, if a multiple employer trust does qualify as a welfare benefit plan, the substantive provisions of ERISA
would not impose any requirements on the plan other than reporting
and observance of the fiduciary standards: the vesting and funding
42
provisions of ERISA cover only pension plans.
Neither a definitional approach nor an analysis from the
perspective of the policy of employee protection can provide a clearcut and consistent answer to the question whether a multiple employer trust is a plan under section 3 of ERISA. Although many
multiple employer trusts are insurance packages offered by insurance companies or organized through other means, and do not meet
the definition of a plan under section 3, there are multiple employer
trusts that may meet the components of the statutory definition of
an "employee benefit plan." In principle, this determination should
4 3
turn on the plain meaning of the statute.
Unfortunately, whether a multiple employer trust falls within
,' Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
," Doubt focused both on the character of the plans as insurance and on federal preemption under LMRA and WPPDA. See Metropolitan Police Retiring Ass'n v. Tobriner, 306 F.2d
775 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); West &
Co. v. Sykes, 257 Ark. 245, 515 S.W.2d 635 (1974); Goetz, Regulationof UninsuredEmployee
Welfare Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 319; Note, Insurance Regulation-Employee Benefit Plans, 28 ARK. L. REv. 515 (1975); Note, Self-Insured Employee
Welfare Plans and the 501(c)(9) Trust: The Specter of State Regulation, 43 U. Cm. L. REv.
325 (1974).
"I Under the argument advanced by the METs, ERISA is claimed to be a federal statute
specifically relating to insurance and hence not within the McCarran Act. See Brummond,
The Legal Status of UninsuredNoniollectively-BargainedMultiple Employer Welfare Trusts
Under ERISA and State InsuranceLaws, 28 SvaAcusE L. REv. 701,719 (1977). This argument,
however, still must deal with section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1976), which expressly provides that ERISA does not preempt state insurance law. See text
and note at note 118 supra, and text and notes at notes 259-272 infra. The METs have
countered this positiof by contending that the "deemer" provision of ERISA section
514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976), which forbids states to regulate an employee
benefit plan by merely deeming it to be "insurance," precludes state regulation of METs as
de facto insurance companies. But see Brummond, supra, at 723.
m See text and note at note 55 supra.
, The Supreme Court has held that "[iln the absence of persuasive reasons to the
contrary, we attribute to the words of a statute their ordinary meaning." Banks v. Chicago
Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968).
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the specific provisions of section 3 has little to do with whether
preemption under ERISA seriously threatens employee interests.
Paradoxically, preemption is least likely to do extensive damage in
the case of programs fully insured with independent carriers,'44 but
these programs are often hard to distinguish from other insurance
packages and are least likely to meet the definition of a plan under
section 3.145 Problems may arise even with regard to these plans. For
example, administrators of fully insured plans typically act in a
dual capacity, as sales agents for the insurance company and as
managers responsible for the trust's claims administration, ratemaking, benefit design, and general administration."' A multiple
employer trust that is fully insured, however, holds the policy of the
carrier as its principal asset, and state regulation of the insurance
company will offer protection in the area of underwriting practices
and reserves. Therefore, preemption of such plans does not create a
great risk of ultimate losses to participants as a group, although to
leave vesting and benefit provisions unregulated may leave individuals without adequate protection in particular cases.'47
Self-funded multiple employer trusts would not offer the same
contingent protections if they were held to be ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. Benefit plans are rarely fully funded. Selffunded trusts lack the contingency reserves of insurance companies,
and their legal liability is limited to actual trust assets, so that there
is greater risk that such plans will be unable to meet their obligations. Preemption would exempt these plans from any indirect minimum funding requirements that the states might otherwise impose.
Unfortunately, the growing reluctance of insurers to expand their
involvement in this area following the failure of several multiple
employer trusts has resulted in an increase in the number of such
48
trusts electing to rely on self-funding.'
To define all multiple employer trusts as ERISA plans may
' See Brummond, supra note 141, at 701-02; cf. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70
(1st Cir. 1977) (state insurance law imposed mandatory substantive provisions on plans),
discussed at notes 262-266 infra.
" See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columus Agency Serv. Corp. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977), discussed at notes 163-169 infra.
HI Bolnick, Multiple Employer Trusts, 78 BEST's REv. 20 (1977); A. Thaler, Some
Thoughts of a Consulting Actuary on the Subject of Self-Insured M.E.T. Business 2-3 (Dec.
7, 1976) (unpublished paper on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
11 See note 145 supra.
"a See Fletcher, supra note 137, at 73. In 1977 and the first half of 1978, at least five selfinsured METs became insolvent. 106 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-9 (June 1, 1978). The reduced
margin of actuarial error self-funded plans have in comparison with insured plans makes
some provision for stop-loss insurance advisable for self-funded METs to help cushion unexpected loss experiences.
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extend the scope of preemption to insurance packages masquerading as employee benefit plans. It would also leave some employees
without adequate protection, particularly those covered by unfunded and uninsured plans. To track the language of section 3
literally might, on the other hand, produce results that appear inconsistent, formalistic, and unrelated to the policy of employee protection. Finally, to exclude all multiple employer trusts from the
scope of the definition of "employee benefit plan" is to react to a
difficult public policy problem by adopting a simplistic interpretation that overlooks many of the component factors that determine
whether something is a "plan" within the meaning of ERISA. For a
court to ignore the plain language of ERISA because of the court's
perception that employee protection calls for state regulation
threatens the integrity of ERISA as a uniform, nationwide regulatory scheme; nor is it clear that multiple employer trusts are necessarily more in need of state regulation than other kinds of employee
welfare benefit plans that are subjected only to federal reporting
and fiduciary standards because they are more clearly covered by
sections 3 and 514 of ERISA.
Nevertheless, congressional committees, the Department of
Labor, and the courts have generally responded to the definitional
and policy issues by holding that multiple employer trusts lie outside the scope of the definition of employee benefit plans for purposes of preemption under section 514. After expressing concern
that "certain entrepreneurs" interested in profiting from administering the plans were marketing insurance products free of state
regulation under the guise that they were in fact covered by ERISA,
the House Committee on Education and Labor concluded that these
plans were not among the "employee benefit plans" defined in section 3(3) of ERISA.4 9 The Committee stated that such programs
were established not to bring them within the jurisdiction of ERISA,
but for the purpose of marketing insurance to plan participants.
These plans, the Committee said, were indistinguishable from other
insurance policies sold to employee benefit plans. The Committee
concluded, thus, that state regulation of such programs is not
preempted, "even though such state action is barred with respect
to the plans which purchase these products."' 50
In a recent case involving the status of a multiple employer
trust, the Department of Labor has also supported a restric' H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 48 (1977). See also David, Employee
Benefit Trusts' Growth Alarms Officials; More FailuresFeared, Bus. INs. 1 (Feb. 21, 1977).
I" H.R. REP. No. 1785, supra note 149, at 48.
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tive-although not indefensible-definition of what constitutes an
employee benefit plan under ERISA. In its amicus brief in Bell v.
Employee Security Benefit Association'51 the Department argued
that the program was not an ERISA plan because the Employee
Benefit Security Association ("ESBA") was not an employee organization. Since ESBA did not claim to be an employer, an employer
association, or a labor union, the Department's brief focused on
whether the plan was within ERISA because ESBA was either an
employee representation committee or an employee beneficiary
committee, and argued that it was neither. The Department contended that ESBA was not an employee representation committee
because employee participation was almost nonexistent and ESBA
had no contact with employers. 52' It contended that ESBA was not
an employee beneficiary association because its participants lacked
any commonality of interest with respect to their employment relationships. 53'
The district court agreed that ESBA was insurance rather than
an employee benefit plan and therefore subject to state regulation. '5
The court made extensive inquiry into the distinctions between insurance and welfare plans, asserting that the substance, rather than
the name of the plan, must control: "[J]ust as a state cannot
regulate an employee benefit plan by calling it insurance, neither
can defendants merchandise an insurance program, free of state
regulation, by terming it an employee benefit plan."''5 5 The court
appeared particularly impressed by the fact that ESBA was an
entrepreneurial venture without bona fide employee participation
and that coverage was marketed directly to participants by ESBA
rather than through a preexisting organization.' 6 The court was also
influenced, however, by its belief that such plans needed more regulation than ERISA provided, noting that the failure of other, similar
M'Memorandum of Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae, Bell v. Employee Benefit Ass'n,
437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), reprinted in 150 PENs. REP. (BNA) R-1 (Aug. 15, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Amicus].
15 Id. at R-2.
10 Id. In asserting a requirement of commonality as part of the definition of an employee
beneficiary committee, the Department relied on interpretations of identical language in
WPPDA. See WPPDA § 3(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 302(a)(3) (1970) (repealed 1976).
M 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977). The litigation in Bell was initiated by the State
Commissioner of Insurance who sought to enjoin the plan from conducting business in Kansas
until it complied with state insurance statutes and regulations. Id. at 384.
' Id. at 390.
sa Id. at 392-94. The court pointed out that employees participate in more traditional
employee benefit plans through their membership in labor organizations. ESBA, on the other
hand, provided only for an annual meeting in which the court termed employee participation
to be a "fiction," since participants were required to sign a proxy on purchase of their policy
appointing a plan official as their representative in the event of their nonattendance.
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enterprises demonstrated the need for regulation by the state.1 17
Finally, the court found support for its decision in the legislative
history of ERISA15 6 and in the report of the House Oversight Task
Force.'
Although in Bell, the court did attempt to apply the components of the statutory definition of an employee benefit plan, other
cases have paid less attention to the statutory language. In
Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Co., 1 0 a federal district court in Arizona also found a multiple employer trust to be insurance subject
to state regulation, rather than an immune ERISA plan."' The VIP
multiple employer trust originally had been fully insured, but it
became self-funded at the initiative and under the direction of the
trusts insurance brokers when its insurance company cancelled
the trust's coverage. The court observed that the trust was continued in order for the brokers to continue receiving commissions and
to maintain business relations with their customers, and that the
brokers had designated the trust as an ERISA plan in order to avoid
state insurance regulation."' It is doubtful that the intent of the
organizers of a plan should determine the ERISA status of the plan,
yet here it apparently influenced the court's conclusion that the
plan was in fact an entrepreneurial enterprise rather than an employee benefit plan.
A different approach to enhancing employee protection was
adopted by another district court in Wayne Chemical Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp.16 3 The employer-plaintiff had purchased
a group medical insurance policy for some of its employees from the
Columbus Agency Service Corporation ("CASCO"), which was in
turn an agent for the National Multiple Employers Foundation
("NMEF") and the Association Life Insurance Company. The policy was formally transferred to NMEF on July 1, 1975.64 When an
employee of Wayne Chemical attempted to claim under the policy
on behalf of his 18-year-old son who was paralyzed in an accident,
he was informed that the benefits would terminate on his son's
$7Id. at 392.
Id. at 385-87. See text and notes at notes 93-132 supra.
, Id. at 392. See note 149 supra.

15

434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
," Id. at 1197, 1200. The State Insurance Director also instituted proceedings in state
court to be appointed receiver of the defendant trust in order to protect beneficiaries whose
claims were cut-off by the trustee's termination of the trust as financially unsound. Id. at
1197.
12 Id. at 1198.
'1 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
1,, Id. at 318.
'"
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twentieth birthday, a result prohibited under Indiana law." 5 The
district court held that the plan was within the jurisdiction of
ERISA and that the provisions of Indiana law under which recovery
would have been permitted were preempted. 6 ' The court nevertheless held for the plaintiffs by adopting the applicable Indiana statute as federal common law.'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment, but on different
grounds, holding that both the insolvent insurer and the agent selling the policy were subject to Indiana law and rejecting their claim
that state regulation had been preempted by ERISA. The court held
that the plan was not an employee benefit plan but, rather, insurance. 6 ' NMEF, the court found, had been engaging in the insurance
business in Indiana without the appropriate state certification, and
thus both NMEF and its agent, CASCO, were held liable to the
plaintiffs. After engaging in only a superficial analysis of the specific
definition of "plan" under the Act, the court rested its decision on
the rationale that Congress would have had no reason to oust state
regulation of entrepreneurial insurance programs as a consequence
of its intent to govern employee benefit plans. '"
Permitting multiple employer trusts to operate in a regulatory
vacuum is an unacceptable public policy. Even under the lower
court's approach in Wayne Chemical, governance of multiple employer trusts would have been left to ad hoc determinations by
federal courts, usually after insolvency of a plan and damage to
participants. Under many self-funded plans, it is possible that beneficiaries of an insolvent trust will simply end up in line with other
creditors for a drastically reduced share of the remaining assets. By
leaving regulation of multiple employer trusts in the hands of the
states, courts have reached a result that will enable state insurance
regulatory bodies to provide prospectively for the protection of plan
participants and beneficiaries.'70
19 Id. at 319.
"' Id. at 321.
", Id. at 325. Cf. In re C.D. Moyer Co. Pension Trust, [1978] PENs. PLN GUIDE (CCH)
22,934 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1978) (court promulgated general rule of federal common law
under ERISA since statute did not specifically deal with the issue before the court). See
generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
I 567 F.2d 692, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1977).

"' Id. at 699.
178See also National
PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH)

Business Conference Employee Benefit Ass'n v. Howatt, [1978]
22,778 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1977) (multiple employer trust not an
employee benefit plan under ERISA and hence subject to state insurance regulation). The
superintendent of the New York State Insurance Department also has determined that six
METs were not ERISA plans but providers of insurance and hence subject to state law. In
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Nevertheless, ERISA clearly preempts state authority over
plans that meet the definition of section 3, and if a multiple employer trust meets these terms, state law should be held preempted.
If the results of this legal analysis seem undesirable, if state regulation of multiple employer trusts would be more effective than federal regulation under ERISA,17 ' the solution should be found in legislative amendment rather than in the characterization of all multiple employer trusts as outside the coverage of ERISA. This is not
merely a formalistic argument; the scope of preemption should be
defined not in terms of the perceived needs of particular plans for
state regulation, but in terms of the more fundamental policy of
ERISA to displace state regulation of employee benefit plans'7 2 and
to provide a single, comprehensive, uniform regulatory scheme for
employee pension and welfare benefit plans.
B.

Legal Services Plans

The question of what constitutes a "plan" under ERISA has
arisen in other contexts, such as with regard to legal services
plans.7 3 Legal services are a recent addition to employer-funded
fringe benefits, following an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act
making such services a permissible benefit of funds subject to TaftHartley's jurisdiction. 7'4 The growth of prepaid legal services plans
may permit the delivery of legal services to a wider segment of the
public, 75' but complications are certain to arise in reconciling competing regulatory schemes.
Legal service benefit plans raise two sorts of practical considerations. As in the case of multiple employer trusts, preemption by
ERISA would subject legal services plans only to reporting and fiduciary requirements, and these might not be sufficient to protect
employee interests. In addition, regulation of the legal profession,
like insurance, has traditionally been left to state governance, and
an opinion letter of June, 1977, and an April 17, 1978, addendum, the Superintendent ruled
that the failure of the METs to conform to New York licensing and regulatory policies

subjects insurance licensees of the state to the suspension or revocation of licenses and fines,
and nonlicensees to prosecution for acting on behalf of the plans. 187 PENs. REP. (BNA) A-6
(May 5, 1978); 145 id. at A-9 (July 11, 1977).
'
See, e.g., Brummond, supra note 141, at 739.
7 See Oversight on ERISA, supra note 135, 542-43 (summary of statement of the ERISA
Industry Committee [ERIC]); id. at 359-61 (statement of Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor).
,73See generally Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7.
,"I Act of Aug. 15, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-95, 87 Stat. 314.
175See generally, Bartosic & Bernstein, Group Legal Services as a FringeBenefit: Lawyers for Forgotten Clients Through Collective Bargaining,59 VA. L. REv. 410 (1973).
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such regulation might clash with the regulation, or the freedom from
regulation, that legal services plans might enjoy under the ERISA
regime. Congress did, however, speak directly to the issue of legal
services plans. Section 3(1) of ERISA defines "employee welfare
benefit plan" as including "prepaid legal services."' 71It is therefore
apparent that Congress intended ERISA, and not state law, to regulate benefit plans providing prepaid legal services as a fringe benefit. 177 Nonetheless, as with multiple employer trusts, prepaid legal
services plans of a primarily entrepreneurial character have been
78
construed not to be ERISA-covered "plans.'
In Suffolk County Bar Association v. Law Research Service,
Inc.,' a county bar association sought to enjoin the respondents,
nonlawyers, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The
respondents claimed that as an ERISA-covered plan they were
immune from state law under section 514 of ERISA. Employing
reasoning similar to that employed by the federal district court in
Bell, " a New York Supreme Court held that the plan was not maintained by an "employee organization" within the meaning of the
Act and that it was therefore subject to the rules and standards of
the local bar.
The court might have reached the same conclusion on the
ground that regulating what constitutes the practice of law is not
preempted by ERISA because such regulation does not "relate to"
employee benefit plans within the meaning of section 514.'1' The
scope of the "relate to" language will be discussed in the next section. It is troubling, however, that the New York court chose not to
face this issue head-on, but preferred to reach the result it desired
by interpreting ERISA's definition of employee benefit plan narrowly. The potential for mischief, if not major disruption of Congress's regulatory scheme, should be apparent.
IV.

WHEN DOES A STATE LAW "RELATE TO" AN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT

PLAN?

The preemptive language of section 514 of ERISA is very broad,
providing, with certain exceptions, that state laws are superseded
"129 U.S.C.

§ 1002(1) (1976), quoted in note 133 supra.
"n See Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, and accompanying text.
,18 ERISA Op. Letter 78-04, NEBA, Inc. Pre-Paid Legal Service Plan National Employee
Benefit Ass'n (Ark. Insurance Dept.) (Feb. 27, 1978) (prepaid legal service plan not an
employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA section 3 since sponsoring entity not an
"employer" or "employee organization").
'7, [1978] PENs. PLAN GUIDE (CCH)
22,756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1978).
' See text and notes at notes 154-159 supra.
"' See text and note at note 184 infra.
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not only if they directly regulate an employee benefit plan, but
insofar as they "relate to" such a plan.' 81 While on its face this
terminology seems straightforward, the dimensions of remaining
83
state authority have been the source of growing controversy.'
In one sense, defining "relate to" raises issues complementary
to those involved in defining an "employee benefit plan." To ask
whether a particular set of arrangements constitutes an "employee
benefit plan" invites analysis of the nature of the arrangements. To
ask whether a state regulation "relates to" an ERISA plan invites
an inquiry into the scope of the regulation and its impact on the
ERISA plan. Ultimately, however, the policy questions involved in
determining whether a state law "relates to" a plan are more complex than those raised by the definition of what constitutes a
"plan," and they cut more deeply into the fabric of federal-state
relations. If "relate to" is interpreted broadly, consistent state regulation may become impossible in areas traditionally left to state
governance, even when the state is not trying to regulate benefit
plans as such, for the regulation would be preempted insofar as it
happens to impose substantive requirements on an ERISA plan.'"
If "relate to" is interpreted restrictively, states will be able to impose requirements on ERISA plans in the course-or in the
guise-of regulating other matters, thus destroying the nationwide
uniformity of the regulatory scheme established by Congress.
In recent years, as noted above, courts have hesitated to interpret congressional intent as calling for broad preemption of state
law.'1 Although the legislative history of ERISA reveals that Congress did intend the scope of preemption to be sweeping, courts
interpreting the "relate to" language have occasionally shown more
solicitude for the autonomy of states in areas traditionally left to
state governance than for the integrity of ERISA, particularly when
preemption seemed to require an inequitable result in the particular
litigation.
A.

State Regulation of Substantive Benefits
Two early decisions by Judge Renfrew of the United States
''

ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). See text and notes at notes 114-132 supra.

See, e.g., Sacher, ERISA Litigation, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIV. THIRTIETH
ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 257, 263-66 (1977).
13

'u 'In Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), because such
issues were not before the court in that case, a federal district court refused to respond to the
suggestion that a broad construction of the "relate to" phrase in section 514 would entirely
prohibit state regulation of the medical profession or hospitals, since such regulations "relate
to" employee benefit plans. Id. at 1297 n.10. See note 193 infra and accompanying text.
I" See text and notes at notes 102-113 supra.
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District Court for the Northern District of California interpreted the
"relate to" language to hold that ERISA preempts state regulation
of insurance that imposed substantive requirements directly on
ERISA plans. In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,'8 ' Judge Renfrew
held that the California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act
of 197517 was preempted under section 514 of ERISA. The KnoxKeene Act sought to promote the delivery of health care services and
to ensure that participants had been well informed of the available
benefits and financial position of various plans. The Act sought to
accomplish this by directly regulating plans and health care services
as well as providers of health insurance. It also required plans to
comply with disclosure 8' and funding' requirements, and imposed
standards on marketing methods"' and the quality of services provided.' 9' The state legislation thus imposed substantive requirements that in some instances were duplicative of the federal legislation and that generally served the same purposes as ERISA, although ERISA subjects welfare benefit plans only to reporting and
fiduciary standards.
Despite the assertion by the state that the phrase "relate to"
was "vague and ambiguous," Judge Renfrew concluded that it was
doubtful Congress could have been any more precise." 2 In a footnote
he dismissed assertions by the state that the "relate to" language,
if broadly construed, might preempt state regulation of the medical
profession or hospitals since such laws arguably "relate to" employee benefit plans. Judge Renfrew stated that "neither the outer
boundaries of ERISA's preemption provisions, nor the permissibility of Knox-Keene's regulation of health care providers, are issues
before the Court in this action.""' After engaging in an extensive
recitation of the legislative history of section 514, Judge Renfrew
concluded that "Congress ultimately enacted Section 514(a) with
the express purpose of summarily preempting state regulation of
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. That the statute, standing
alone or buttressed by its legislative history, was intended to supersede state regulation of benefit plans such as plaintiffs' is indisputable."" 4
425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
"'

CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

Id. §§ 1371, 1383, 1384.
' Id. §§ 1375.1-.2, 1376.
" Id. §§ 1357-1366.
,' Id. §§ 1367, 1370.
425 F. Supp. at 1297.
Id. n.10.
"'

Id. at 1300.

§

1340-1399.64 (West Supp. 1977).
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Judge Renfrew took a similar position later the same year in
Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 5 in which Standard Oil sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act.' 5 Standard Oil's self-funded health benefit plan, which included participant-employees in the state of Hawaii, reimbursed employees and other participants for a percentage
of the cost of certain health care services. The Hawaii Act required
plans such as the one provided by Standard Oil, in addition to
meeting the Act's reporting requirement, to include coverage for
diagnosis and treatment of alcohol and drug abuse.'97 After holding
that the Hawaii Act was not a disability insurance law, and hence
that the plan was not exempted from ERISA under section
4(b)(3),198 Judge Renfrew rejected the state's argument that only
those portions of the Hawaii Act in direct conflict with ERISA were
superseded and held that ERISA entirely preempted the Hawaii
Act. " Focusing on the "relate to" terminology, Judge Renfrew reaffirmed his earlier reading of the legislative history of section 514 in
Hewlett-Packard as "foreclos[ing] any interpretation which would
narrow its scope beyond its plain language. '0 0
Some courts and commentators have cited Judge Renfrew's
broad interpretation of section 514(a) in Hewlett-Packard as precedent for an expansive interpretation of ERISA's preemption of
state laws affecting employee benefit plans. 0 ' Other courts have
442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
" HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1976).
,, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws, ch. 25 (amending HAw. REv. STAT. § 393-7(c)).
" 442 F. Supp. at 698, 706. Section 4(b)(3) of ERISA exempts from title I coverage any
employee benefit plan "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1975). The question whether the plan was exempt under section 4(b)(3)
was the principal issue in the case and most of the opinion focused on that issue. The court
concluded that the Hawaii Act was not a disability insurance law based on its reading of
the statutory language and legislative history and because the Hawaii Act provided a broad
range of health care benefits far beyond any other state disability insurance statute. 442 F.
Supp. at 702.
" Id. at 706-07.
m Id. at 707.
Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 76-77, nn.34 & 37 (1st Cir. 1977) (discussed infra
W1,
at notes 262-272); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D. Kan.
1977) (discussed supra at notes 154-159); National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D.Conn. 1978); National Bank of North America v. IBEW Local 3,
400 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484-85 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Other courts have followed Judge Renfrew's
reasoning. See Cate v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 434 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Tenn.
1977); Wayne Chem.Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.),
rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussed supra at notes 163-169);
Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Memorandum
of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 10, National Carriers' Conference Comm. v.
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accepted his interpretation of the "relate to" language, but have
nevertheless upheld state regulation on the ground that it was exempted from preemption by the savings clause of section 514(b) ,2M
that the plan regulated was not an "employee benefit plan, 2 0 or on
other grounds. 20 4 One recent case has departed from both approaches by adopting a diametrically opposed reading of the "relate
to" language with respect to welfare benefit plans.
In Gast v. Oregon,2°5 the Oregon State Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision that had held that ERISA superseded
a state law requiring that women employees who become pregnant
receive the same benefits "as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work by reason of physical condition. ' 26 The court's opinion is significant both for its willingness to
meet head-on the issue raised by ERISA's preemption of state regulation of welfare benefit plans and for the radical limitations it
imposed on the scope of preemption under ERISA. Writing for the
court, Judge Johnson did not claim that the health and benefit trust
administered by plaintiffs was not an "employee benefit plan." '
He rejected the state's argument that the law requiring the provision of pregnancy benefits was a state law regulating insurance and
thus not preempted by virtue of ERISA's savings clause, holding
that it regulated employment practices and thus lay outside the
scope of the savings clause.0 '
Judge Johnson focused on the fact that ERISA subjects welfare
benefit plans only to reporting and fiduciary standards. He refused
to infer from this a congressional intent "to cease all governmental
Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978); Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets
the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDiNE L. REV.
191, 231 n.181 (1978); Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA? (paper
presented to ABA Sectionj of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law) (January 13,
1978) at 20 (copy on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); NAIC Statement,
supra note 135.
202E.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977); Cate v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 434 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
2 E.g., Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
2' E.g., National Bank v. IBEW Local 3, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (ERISA
section 206 prohibiting assignment of beneficiary's interest does not prohibit garnishment).
20 212 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-11 (Or. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1978).
2M OR. REv. STAT. § 659.029 (1977).
Senator Javits has stated that "passage of the pregnancy sex discrimination amendments . . . [Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)] appears to have mooted the issue of
preemption of State laws requiring disability plans to cover pregnancy-related leave." 125
CONG. REC. 575 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). Even if the specific issue facing the Oregon court in
Gast is now mooted, the court's approach to preemption analysis under ERISA has far larger
implications.
"7 212 PENS. REP. (BNA) at D-13.
" Id. at D-13 to -14.
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regulation, state or federal, other than the disclosure and fiduciary
requirements of health and welfare benefits paid by employers or
employee organizations." ' 9 Rather, Judge Johnson spoke directly to
the issue that has clearly most disturbed the courts.
[If we are to adopt the construction of 29 USC § 1144(a)
advanced by plaintiffs we must import to Congress not only an
intent to preempt state law, but also an intent to cease all
governmental regulation, state or federal, other than the disclosure and fiduciary requirements of health and welfare benefits
paid by employers or employee organizations. There is nothing
in the legislative history suggesting such an intent. To the contrary, the legislative history indicates Congress was concerned
with the inadequacy of governmental regulations and concluded that there should be at least minimum federal stan2
dards with respect to disclosure and fiduciary responsibility. "'
Judge Johnson's view that ERISA is not concerned with the
regulation of health and welfare benefit plans except to the extent
it imposes reporting and fiduciary standards on them, and that
state laws that impose other standards therefore do not "relate to"
the ERISA plan within the meaning of section 514(a), cannot be
maintained on grounds of legislative history, statutory language, or
policy. Judge Johnson recognized that the broad preemptive language of section 514(a) was adopted in preference to earlier versions
"which expressly restricted preemption to state laws which directly
related to the specific matters regulated by ERISA. ' 21 ERISA contains various exceptions from the scope of preemption, but nowhere
does the Act suggest that employee health benefit plans are also
exempt from preemption, even in part. Finally, although allowing
state regulation of funding, vesting, and benefit provisions of these
plans may appear to further the cause of employee protection, it
would create immense difficulties for multistate plans resulting
from industry-wide collective bargaining agreements or involving
employees of multistate companies.
In its extreme position, Gast v. Oregon represents a distinct
minority view, but the concerns it states openly have repeatedly
influenced the courts. Even direct state regulation of substantive
features of an ERISA plan may be upheld if the state's concern is
not with benefit plans as such but with the implementation of a
policy not logically related to benefit plans, such as the prohibition
" Id. at D-14.
210

Id.

211Id.

at D-15.
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of gender-based employment discrimination. Thus, in Time Insur2 2
ance Co. v. Departmentof Industry, Labor and Human Relations,
a Wisconsin state court reached the same result as Gast-that
ERISA does not preempt state law forbidding an employee disability plan from excluding benefits for pregnancy from its coverage 213 -although on the narrower and less principled ground that the
state antidiscrimination provisions were "merely of peripheral concern"21 to ERISA.
B.

Spousal Rights and Family Support

It is where ERISA clashes with state law and court orders involving spousal rights and family support that the "relate to" language has been particularly subject to manipulation. Recently a
number of cases have focused on the apparent conflict between
sections 514(a) and 206(d)(1) of ERISA and various state laws or
state court orders dealing with alimony, community property and
other spousal rights. 215 One of the first and most important, Stone
v. Stone,2 1 grew out of a 1974 California divorce decree that divided
the couple's marital property under the state's community property
system and, as part of the division, awarded the wife a 40% interest
in the husband's retirement benefits.2 17 The husband's alleged failure to pay this amount led his wife to institute an action against the
pension plan to compel it to pay her share to her directly each
month. The action raised two preemption issues: whether section
206(d)(1) of ERISA,21 which prohibits the assignment or alienation
of benefits, preempts state authority to order an ERISA plan to pay
benefits directly to a nonemployee spouse, and whether section
22

No. 154-423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 1978). On the effect of Public Law Number 95-555,

92 Stat. 2076 (1978), see note 206 supra.
213No. 154-423, slip op. at 5.
214Id., slip op. at 11.
2M5 See Hutchinson, Preemption UnderERISA and State Law Spousal Rights, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 8,1979, at 22.
21,450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
217Id. at 920. The number of suits seeking to attach spousal rights in pension plans has
been accelerated in California by a state court opinion which held it malpractice for an
attorney to fail to join in a divorce proceeding a pension plan in which one of the spouses has
an interest. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1974).
211ERISA section 206(d)(1) states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan shall not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C..§ 1056(d)(1) (1976).
ERISA section 206(d)(2), however, permits a voluntary assignment of up to ten percent of
the pension benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1976). See Wilkins v. Conroy, [1978] PENs. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 22,798 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 1978) (ten percent exception permits creditor
attachment of pension interest in that amount); National Bank v. IBEW, id. 22,906 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 1977) (plan ordered to pay ten percent of beneficiary's pension payment
directly to judgment creditor).
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514(a) of ERISA preempts California community property laws as
relating to employee benefit plans.
Judge Renfrew, who had interpreted "relate to" broadly in
Hewlett-Packard"' and Standard Oil, 22 read it restrictively here,
ruling that there is a "narrow category of laws which affect employee
benefit plans but which do not relate to them within the meaning
of Section 514(a)."221 Judge Renfrew reconciled his decision that the
community property laws do not "relate to" employee benefit plans
(that is, are not preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA) with his
earlier decision in Standard Oil-and presumably HewlettPackard-ontwo grounds. First, he explained that state regulation
of community property is much better established than the exercise
of state police powers over benefit plans, meaning not only that such
regulation antedates state regulation of benefit plans, but that it
involves a much more fundamental area of state concern. To allow
federal preemption in this area, he wrote, would be a drastic intrusion into the balance of federal and state powers. 222 Second, Judge
Renfrew continued, the effect of preemption in Standard Oil still
left the employee-participants free to bargain collectively for the
substantive protections provided by the Hawaii Act, whereas
preemption in Stone would have left the nonemployee spouse with2
out an effective remedy. 23
With respect to the other preemption issue, Judge Renfrew
found no conflict between ordering an ERISA plan to pay a nonemployee spouse directly and the purposes of section 206(d)(1) because "[miembers of the families of employees are included in the
class which ERISA protects. 22 In other words, section 206(d)(1) is
intended to ensure that benefits will be available for financial support after retirement, but this cannot bar the claims of those whom
ERISA protects. In this connection, too, Judge Renfrew emphasized
that preemption by ERISA might leave the nonemployee spouse
with no effective means of support if the pension benefits constituted the primary community asset and the spouse could not collect
directly from the pension plan, observing that "[u]nfortunately,
213See

text and notes at notes 186-194 supra.

See text and notes at notes 195-200 supra.
"2 450 F. Supp. at 932 (emphasis added).
"

=2

Id.

" Id. at 932-33.
21 Id. at 925. Judge Renfrew concluded that merely characterizing the nonemployee
spouse's interest as a preexisting ownership right was not dispositive. To base the ruling on
that rationale, he observed, would result in nonemployee spouses in states that do not recognize preexisting spousal rights in marital property being unable to collect benefits. Id. at 92526. See Pattiz, supra note 201, at 205-20.
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the refusal of spouses to honor their marital obligations after divorce
' '2
is not an uncommon occurrence. 2
The opinion in Stone is open to criticism on several grounds.
Judge Renfrew made no reference to the Internal Revenue Service
regulations"I interpreting the assignment and alienation provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code, which largely duplicate those in
ERISA and would appear to prohibit the result sought by the spouse
in Stone. His analysis of the "relate to" language in section 514(a)
is also disappointing. In Hewlett-PackardJudge Renfrew had demurred on the necessity of locating the "outer boundaries of
ERISA's preemption provisions. 22 Rather than helping to locate
those boundaries, Stone may have contributed to a further balkanization of preemption under ERISA. The Stone opinion does not deal
directly with the broad reading of "relate to" in the Standard Oil
and Hewlett-Packard decisions, but simply concludes that both
California's interest in governing the disposition of marital property
and justice to the nonemployee spouse necessitate permitting a direct cause of action against the plan. Asserting policy grounds for
not preempting state law is not at all the same as showing that a
particular state regulation does not "relate to" an ERISA plan
within the meaning that Congress intended to give this language.
The precision of analysis applied in Hewlett-Packardand Standard
Oil is singularly lacking in Stone.
Judge Renfrew's holding that section 206(d)(1) does not bar
direct actions by a nonemployee spouse against an ERISA plan
because the purpose of ERISA is to protect the employee family is
particularly troubling. It appears to overlook that section 206(d) (1)
also protects the ERISA plan from numerous or competing claims
by parties other than the plan participant. More important, to ignore the plain language of the statute on the grounds that the state
regulation at issue complements the aims of ERISA and does not
contradict them opens the way to far greater limitation on preemption than Judge Renfrew himself would accept. The judge's reasoning in Stone is not dissimilar to Judge Johnson's conclusion in
22 450 F. Supp. at 926-27. California has now amended its divorce law to permit the
joinder of employee pension plans in actions for divorce, child custody, support, and other
marital settlements. CAL. CIVM CODE § 4351 (West Supp. 1978). See 178 PEms. REP. (BNA)
A-17 (March 6, 1978). The statutory changes conform to case law developments, particularly
a decision of the California Court of Appeals permitting joinder of plans as third parties in
possession of marital property. Sommers v. Sommers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 509, 126 Cal. Rptr.

220 (1975).
2" Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13, T.D. 6534.
" 425 F. Supp. at 1297 n.10.
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Gast 228 that state regulation of the substantive provisions of health

and welfare benefits is not preempted because such regulation enhances employee protection and because the purpose of ERISA was
to impose standards and not to deregulate benefit plans.
The Second Circuit, the only court of appeals to have addressed
this issue, has also held that sections 514 and 206(d) (1) do not forbid
garnishment of plan benefits to satisfy court-ordered family support
payments. In AT&T v. Merry,229 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected "the unreasonable conclusion that Congress intended to preempt even those state laws that only in the most remote and peripheral manner touch upon pension plans," particularly when "that interpretation would include placing a limitation
on state authority to enforce alimony and support orders." ' o The
court followed the reasoning of Stone, which it cited with approval. 231 Merry, however, involved only alimony and child support
payments, not a community property settlement. The latter, as the
Supreme Court has recently recognized in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo,M 2 is not based on need; the rationale for finding an
implied exception to ERISA's preemption provisions is weaker for
community property settlements than where a court has determined
that a beneficiary's wife or children need support. 233
A number of other lower courts have also reached the conclusion that ERISA did not preempt state community property laws,
and that section 206(d)(1) does not prohibit enforcement of a support judgment against an employee's pension benefits or deductions
from such benefits of payments to be made directly as alimony or
as child support. 234 Moreover, the Justice Department, far from opm See text at notes 205-211 supra.
2" Nos. 78-7484 & 78-7518 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1979). The Second Circuit followed Merry in
Cody v. Riecker, No. 78-7460 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1979) (involving spousal and child support
orders prior to divorce).
2N Nos. 78-7484 & 78-7518, slip op., at 1231.
n Id., slip op., at 1231, 1233-34.
99 S.Ct. 802, 811 (1979). See text and notes at notes 237-253 infra.
"3 While community property was not at issue in AT&T v. Merry, the court of appeals
distinguished Stone from Hisquierdoin a long footnote which emphasized that the Supreme
Court in Hisquierdohad specifically left open the issue of whether ERISA preempted garnishment orders to satisfy community property settlements. Nos. 78-7484 & 78-7518, slip op. at
1234 n.11 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1979). See text at note 251 infra.
m E.g., Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cody v. Riecker, 454 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) alffd, No. 78-7460 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1979); In re Pardee, 408 F. Supp.
666 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Biles v. Biles, 216 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-1 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 2, 1978);
M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc.2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Faro. Ct. 1978); Southern Cal. IBEWNECA Pension Plan v. Superior Court, 105 PENs.REP. (BNA) D-18 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1976).
See generally Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Pattiz, supra note 201, at 230-41;
Hardie, Pay Now or Later:Alternatives in the Dispositionof Retirement Benefits on Divorce,
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posing such decisions, recently filed an amicus brief with the Second
Circuit in the Merry case on behalf of the Departments of Labor and
to secthe Treasury, arguing that Congress intended an exception
235
tion 206(d)(1) for alimony and family support orders.
There have, however, been cases holding to the contrary. In
Francis v. United Technologies Corp.,235 for example, the District
Court for the Northern District of California adopted an expansive
reading of ERISA's preemption provision and concluded that
"ERISA has pre-empted the operation of so much of California's
community property laws as purport to give a non-employee spouse
an interest in plan benefits." The court then held that since the
spouse was neither a plan participant nor a fiduciary and had not
been designated a beneficiary of the plan by her former husband,
she had no standing to sue the plan for benefit payments.
The Supreme Court may have given some indication of its attitude toward spousal claims against plans covered by ERISA in its
recent decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,2 7 in which it rejected
a spousal claim of a community property interest in future retirement benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974.238 Benefits
under the Railroad Act are not contractual; Congress retained the
right to alter or eliminate them at any time.2 39 Furthermore, section
231m of the Act prohibits the assignment, taxation, garnishment or
attachment of benefits.240 In 1975, Congress created an exception to
this section and similar provisions in other federal benefit plans to
permit benefits to be reached for the purpose of satisfying a legal
obligation to pay child support or alimony, 2 1 but Congress has since
qualified this exception by defining "alimony" as not including
claims under community property laws. 2 2 In spite of these provi53 CALIF. ST. B.J. 106 (1978); Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension
Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187, 202-10 (1978).
"I Memorandum of the Department of Justice, Amicus Curiae, AT&T v. Merry, Nos.
78-7484 & 78-7518 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1979).
23 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also General Motors v. Townsend, 177 PENS.
REP. (BNA) D-1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 1978); Hutchinson, supra note 215, at 23.
-7 99 S.Ct. 802 (1979).
= 45 U.S.C. §§ 231, 231a-231t (1976).
2' 99 S.Ct. at 805.
'A Section 231m provides:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory, or the
District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be
subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any
circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated.
45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976)
"' Social Security Act § 459, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
2 Id. § 462. 42 U.S.C.A. § 662(c) (Supp. 1977).
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24 3 the California Supreme
sions, in In re Marriage of Hisquierdo
Court ruled that the nonemployee spouse was not a creditor barred
by section 231m, but a present owner of an expectancy interest in
the future benefits arising from the employment of his or her spouse
during marriage.2 44 The court did not mention the recent congressional redefinition of "alimony.?'
Although it reversed the decision of the California court, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that family law is the province of the states. Thus, state law must do "'major damage' to
'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy
Clause will demand that state law be overridden." '45 The Court
nevertheless concluded that "California must defer to the federal
statutory scheme for allocating Railroad Retirement Act benefits
insofar as the terms of federal law require. The critical terms here
include a specified beneficiary protected by a flat prohibition
against attachment and anticipation. 21 6 The Court thus rejected
the nonemployee spouse's claim by applying a straightforward preemption analysis. Significantly for purposes of sections 514 and
206(d)(1) of ERISA, the Court refused to follow the California state
courts and to focus on the question whether the nonemployee spouse
was a present owner. "Such rights in the abstract" are not dispositive of the case, the Court declared, because "[t]he pertinent questions are whether the right as asserted conflicts with the express
terms of federal law and whether its consequences sufficiently injure
2 47
the objectives of the federal program to require non-recognition.
The Court used language in Hisquierdothat appears applicable
to the interpretation of sections 514 and 206(d)(1) of ERISA. It
stated that section 231m, "[1like anti-attachment provisions generally . . . ensures that the benefits actually reach the beneficiary. . . . It prevents the vagaries of state law from disrupting the
national scheme, and guarantees a national uniformity that enhances the effectiveness of congressional policy." 4 8 To what extent
Hisquierdo indicates how the Court would deal with similar issues
confronting private plans under ERISA is clouded by several fac243 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977). The nonemployee spouse
claimed that she was entitled to 19.6 percent of the total benefits to be received, based on
half the benefits attributable to the employee spouse's labor during nearly 14 years of marriage. 99 S.Ct. at 807.
2" In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 616-17, 566 P.2d 224, 226, 139 Cal. Rptr.
590, 592 (1977).
2
99 S.Ct. at 808.
5,, Id. at 809.

247Id.

24AId.
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tors, however. First, Hisquierdo dealt with a separate statutory
structure that is substantially different from ERISA. Sections 459
and 462 of the Social Security Act expressly exclude alimony from
the antialienation provision of section 231m of the Railroad Act, but
then expressly exclude claims under community property laws from
the definition of alimony.29 The Court concluded that "Congress
• . .thought that a family's need for support could justify garnishment, even though it deflected other federal benefit programs from
their intended goals, but that community property claims, which
are not based on need, could not do so."O Second, and equally
important, the Court stressed that in the Railroad Act Congress
provided a separate spouse's benefit that terminates upon absolute
divorce. The Court explained: "Different considerations might well
apply where Congress has remained silent on the subject of benefits
for spouses, particularly when the pension program is a private one
25
'
which federal law merely regulates. '
Third, the Court observed that under section 231m payments
are not to be "anticipated. 2 5 2 The decision of the California Supreme Court would have compelled the employee spouse to pay the
nonemployee spouse a lump-sum community property settlement
based on benefits that may never be paid, since the employee could
die before collecting benefits, thus diminishing the employee's estate, or leave the industry before retirement, thus becoming ineligible for supplemental benefits. Moreover, the Court pointed out,
there is a continuing possibility that Congress might alter the Act's
terms.2 3 It is thus unclear to what extent Hisquierdo'streatment of
community property laws gives guidance to courts wrestling with
community property claims arising under private plans in which
benefits are vested or in pay status. It would appear, however, that
the Court's reasoning in refusing to permit community property
status to enforce a present interest by a nonemployee spouse in
unpaid benefits applies equally to private ERISA plans. In both
cases what is claimed is that the employee spouse must pay the
present value of benefits that are contingent.
Equally significant is the Court's clear message that the ultimate resolution of issues of this sort is within the province of Congress. The most important precedent set by Hisquierdomay be that
the Court intends to leave the policy aspects of questions of this sort
'

2S

See text and notes at notes 241-242 supra.
99 S.Ct. at 811.

21 Id. at 813 n.24.
"2 Id. at 811.

= Id. at 811-12.
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to the political branches. As discussed above with respect to multiple employer trusts, the preemption scheme established by ERISA
may be in need of reform. State regulation of substantive provisions
of welfare benefit plans is not desirable. Nevertheless, the scope of
preemption can probably be restricted, without harming the integrity of ERISA, to allow spouses and children of plan participants to
obtain the support that is due them directly from pension and similar benefit plans when the employee spouse's entitlement to the
benefit is nonforfeitable and in pay status. The decision to carve out
such an exception to section 206(d)(1) of ERISA should, however,
be made by Congress.
V.

THE SAVINGS CLAUSES

The discussion in the preceding section demonstrates that
courts increasingly are narrowing the scope of preemption under
ERISA by interpreting the "relate to" language of section 514(a)
restrictively. The view that Congress must have intended section
514(a) to be construed narrowly where it appears to preempt state
regulation of matters generally left to state governance is undermined by the succeeding clause, section 514(b), in which Congress
specifically identified areas of state legislation that were not to be
preempted: state law regulating insurance, banking, or securities, 4
and "generally applicable" state criminal law. 5 Congress also wrote
other specific exemptions from preemption into ERISA. Section
4(b)(1),2 6 for example, anticipated the kinds of concerns underlying
the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities27 by
exempting governmental plans from ERISA, including "a plan established or maintained for its employees by the . . . government
of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing. ' ' 256 Section 514(d) provides
that Title I shall not be interpreted to "alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede" other federal laws.25
Congress made clear that the savings clauses in section 514(b)
were not to be used as devices through which states would regulate
employee benefit plans as such.2 1 Section 514(b)(2)(B) provides
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976).
- ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1976).
=' 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1976).
211 See text and notes at notes 102-106 supra.
2m 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1) (1976).
=' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976).
20 For example, only a "generally applicable" state criminal law is exempt. ERISA §
514(b)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1976).
2
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that a qualified "employee benefit plan" or a "trust established
under such a plan" (except "plans established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits") cannot be "deemed" an insurance company or an entity "engaged in the business of insurance or
banking" for the purpose of state insurance, securities, and banking
law.2 1 Under this exception to the savings clause, it would appear
that benefit plans continue to be free of direct regulation by the
state even if that regulation is part of a general body of insurance,
securities, or banking law.
More problematic is the question of how far the deemer exception restricts the power of the states to impose substantive requirements on benefit plans indirectly. The language of the savings
clause and the deemer exception is not a clear guide here because
no single formula will respond to all the policy issues involved. It
would appear that state law continues to be preempted in these
areas insofar as its intent, scope, or effect relates primarily or predominantly to ERISA-covered plans and trust funds. Beyond that,
a policy analysis is necessary. Apparently, Congress did not want
ERISA to carve out exceptions to generally applicable state criminal law. The exceptions pertaining to insurance, securities, and
banking regulations are more problematic. The following analysis
suggests that the statutory purpose is best served by concluding that
even indirect state regulations imposing substantive requirements
on ERISA-covered plans are -preempted unless the state can show
that preemption would interfere significantly with the general state
regulation of insurance, securities, or banking.
A.

Insurance Regulation

Regulation of the insurance industry is a matter that Congress
left to the states in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.26 2 Section 514 of
ERISA continued this policy by providing both a specific savings
clause for state insurance law and a savings clause for other federal
laws, including the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Insurance regulation
raises with particular acuteness questions about what a state may
do indirectly that ERISA forbids it to do directly.
A state may, for example, indirectly protect an insured employee benefit plan by regulating underwriting and reserve policies
of the insurance carrier, even if such regulation affects the cost of
the plan. On the other hand, a state should not be allowed to require
that an ERISA plan provide a substantive benefit by enforcing an
21
2

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).

See text and note at note 138 supra.
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insurance regulation against the insurance carrier that provides the
policy to the plan. Unfortunately, that is precisely what some recent
cases have permitted.
Wadsworth v. Whaland 3 involved the question whether a state
statute, requiring issuers of group health policies to include coverage
for treatment of mental illness, applied to a group health policy
purchased by a health and welfare fund. 26' The district court ruled
that the New Hampshire statute was an insurance regulation and
hence not preempted by ERISA.2 65 In affirming the lower court ruling, the First Circuit admitted that the state statute "related to"
an "employee benefit plan," but held that it was saved from
preemption by section 514(b)(2)(A). The court rejected arguments
that the state was violating the "deemer" exception to the savings
clause by deeming the plan an insurance company in order to avoid
federal preemption, holding, instead, that the plan was not being
treated as an insurance company but as the "insured" under a group
26
insurance policy.
A Minnesota district court reached essentially the same result
in Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton,217 when it held that the Minnesota Comprehensive Insurance Act 25 was an insurance law and
not preempted by ERISA. The Minnesota Act required casualty
insurers to offer state residents policies that include a specified
amount of coverage, required employers to offer their employees a
specific form of plan, and established a state Health Association to
offer policies to those otherwise unable to obtain them. Several insurance companies and a nonprofit corporation composed of several
other insurers brought suit challenging the Minnesota statute. The
court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the
Act was within the savings provision of section 514(b)(2)(A) of
20

562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977).
relevant provision of New Hampshire law provides:

214The

Each insurer that issues or renews any policy of group or blanket accident or health
insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses, shall provide to each
group, or to the portion of each group comprised of certificate holders of such insurance
who are residents of this state and whose principal place of employment is in this state,
coverage for expenses arising from the treatment of mental illnesses and emotional
disorders.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 415: 18-a(I) (Supp. 1977).
" Dawson v. Whaland, 105 PENS. PLkN GumE (CCH) 23,245 (D.N.H. Feb. 11, 1977).
288562 F.2d at 76. The court also rejected the argument that the New Hampshire law

had been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, finding that the insurance benefits
were not part of the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. 562 F.2d at
79. See Part VI, supra.
" 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
2" MIN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 62E.01-.17 (West Supp. 1978).
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ERISA and the policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, preserved by
section 514(d) of ERISA. 69
The district court took almost as narrow a view of the preemption doctrine as the Oregon court in Gast,210 stating that under the
savings provision "the conflict between the challenged state insurance law and ERISA has to be very clear in order to trigger the
preemption provision." ' 1 ERISA imposes only reporting and disclosure duties on health and welfare plans, the court continued, and
since those requirements "have nothing to do with the substance of
the insurance plans which employers must offer their employees"
they are not preemptive. 2 In rejecting the motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court had to find that there was not even a
"substantial probability" that plaintiffs could show federal preemption. This finding is open to the same criticisms as the Oregon
court's in Gast, although it is based on the specific language of the
savings clause rather than on a general policy analysis supporting a
restrictive interpretation of the "relate to" language.
Although it was clearly the intent of Congress not to interfere
in the regulation of insurance by the states, this policy was not
intended to extend to permitting state regulation of the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans. That the basic definition of
"employee benefit plan" in section 3(1) specifically includes plans
that fund benefits "through the purchase of insurance"27 3 demonstrates that Congress was fully aware of the role of insurance in
funding benefits when it enacted the broad preemption language in
the Act. Further, the exclusion of "plans established primarily for
the purpose of providing death benefits" from section
514(b)(2)(B)2 4 reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended to
preempt state laws regulating other benefit provisions in ERISA
plans even if these laws applied to all insurance policies.
The doctrinal weaknesses of Wadsworth and Insurer'sAction
Council are all the more serious in view of the adverse policy consequences of the decisions. If states are permitted to require employee
benefit plans to provide substantive benefits under the guise of
insurance regulation, the result may be a Hobson's choice for employer or labor and management negotiators: either abandon the
funding of benefit plans through insurance policies or be willing to
2' 423 F. Supp. at 926; see text and note at note 138 supra.
2'1 See text and notes at notes 205-211 supra.
2 423 F. Supp. at 926.
27z Id.

- 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
4 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
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accept all-encompassing uniform national contracts. For if each
state may impose its own substantive terms on the plan, the only
way uniformity may be reached is by incorporating into the plan all
of the benefits each state requires. This dilemma is clearly of the
type that Congress sought to avoid by enacting ERISA's preemption
provisions, which were formulated to relieve interstate employee
benefit plans of the adverse effects of cumulative or inconsistent
state regulation.
B.

Securities Regulation

The savings clause for state regulation of securities2 5 and the
"deemer" exception to it2' have not led to serious interpretive problems to date. The line separating an investment company from the
management of a plan is relatively clear. An entrepreneurial enterprise does not escape regulation as an investment company merely
because the assets it invests include assets of an employee benefit
plan, but the management of a plan does not become subject to
state regulation of trust and investment companies just because its
funds are invested in securities.
The line separating a "security" from the kind of interest that
employees have in most pension plans is also fairly clear, particularly after the recent decision of the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.27 The Court pointed out that
although Congress had been concerned that "certain interests having the characteristics of a security not be excluded from Securities
Act protection simply because investors realized their return in the
form of retirement benefits, ' 278 this did not mean "that pension
benefits in and of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics
of a security. '27' The Court held that a pension program established
under a collective bargaining agreement which requires employers
to provide a compulsory noncontributory defined-benefit pension
plan as part of the negotiated package of wages and benefits does
not constitute an "investment contract" and that an employee's
interest in such a plan does not constitute a security for purposes
of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
The Court reached this conclusion by applying the test it had
enunciated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.Y0 in 1946. First it noted that
vs ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976).
'

Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
99 S.Ct. 790 (1979).

2' Id.
271

at 799.

Id.

328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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in every case finding an investment contract, "the purchaser gave
up some tangible and definable consideration" in return for the
interest deemed to be a security,28 while "[iln a pension plan such
as this one, by contrast, the purported investment is a relatively
insignificant part of an employee's total and indivisible compensation package. ' 282 The Court also held that an employee's interest in
the plan at issue failed the "common venture" prong of the Howey
test, which requires " 'the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.' ")283
The Court stated that although pension funds do depend "to some
extent" on earnings from their assets, the greater proportion of their
income derives from contributions, which are independent of the
efforts of the funds' managers.24 Finally, the Court observed, what
determines whether an employee's right to benefits has vested "is
his own ability to meet the Fund's eligibility requirement
rather than the Fund's investment success. ' ' 5
After finding support for this position in the legislative history
of the Securities Acts, the Court closed by emphasizing that "[i]f
any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that pension plans
of the type involved are not subject to the Securities Act, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the matter to rest."2 Contrasting
the protection provided by ERISA with the much more limited
protection offered by the Securities Acts, the Court pointed out that
"in light of ERISA it serves no general purpose" to bring noncontributory, compulsory pension plans under the Securities Acts. 287
C.

Banking Regulation

The first case decided under the savings provision for state
banking law was Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson28 in which the
federal district court for Rhode Island held that the Rhode Island
Board of Bank Incorporation could continue to exercise authority
99 S.Ct. at 796.
=' Id. at 797. In defined benefit plans, the Court added, the employer's payments are
not accurately described as "on behalf" of any employee since there is no fixed relation
between an employee's contributions and his ultimate benefits received. Id.
20 Id. (quoting United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
1 99 S.Ct. at 797. Additionally, "a plan usually can count on increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings." id. at 798
(citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
2u Id. at 801.
2" Id. at 802.
m 439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977).
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under state law over the purchase of stock in a bank's parent company by the bank's employee pension benefit plan." 9 Relying on
Wadsworth as precedent,2 90 the court held that the savings provisions of section 514(b)(2)(A) made manifest the intent of Congress
to permit continued state regulation of the banking business. The
court ruled that notwithstanding the comprehensive scope of
ERISA, "Congress did not intend that a state could not protect the
depositors or shareholders of its banks in accordance with its own
regulations simply because the regulated activity somehow also in'2
volved the subject matter of employee benefit plans. '
The same difficulties implicit in Wadsworth may readily be
found in Old Stone Bank. In both cases, the court construed the
savings provision in a manner that permitted substantive regulation
of an employee benefit plan. In Wadsworth a state was permitted
to require indirectly the inclusion of a benefit; in Old Stone Bank a
state was permitted to exercise control over investmentauthorization contained in the plan. Both decisions open the door
to conflicting state regulation of employee benefit plans, thereby
seriously undermining the uniformity of regulation envisioned by
Congress in enacting ERISA.
The court in Old Stone Bank appeared most persuaded by the
argument that if ERISA were held to preempt state regulation in
this area, it would impair the ability of the state to control bank
ownership. It would appear, however, that this state interest can be
served by regulating the bank entity rather than the plan directly,
although indirect regulation of the plan should also be preempted
where that appears to be the dominant purpose of the regulation.
The deemer exception to the savings clause indicates that Congress
did not intend the state interest in bank regulation to be used as
an excuse for maintaining or extending state regulation of the ordinary activities of benefit plans, including their investment decisions, even under laws "purporting to" regulate banking.
D.

State Criminal Laws

Section 514(b)(4) of ERISA provides that "any generally applicable criminal law of a state" is not preempted by ERISA.2 92 Although to date no cases have been decided under this provision, its
2'1Id. The state Board denied approval on the ground that the plan had been implemented before it was submitted to the Board. After denial of approval, the bank filed suit in
federal court claiming that the Board at all times lacked jurisdiction over the plan.
2"

See text at notes 263-266 supra.

2,

439 F. Supp. at 256.

" 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1976).
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ambiguity is exacerbated by an absence of any illuminating legislative history or caselaw. Presumably, a criminal law that is
"generally applicable" is one that has been enacted by a state with
the intention that it apply to conduct generally rather than to an
activity specifically related to employee benefit plans. For example,
a state law making theft illegal would be enforceable against one
accused of stealing assets from a plan, whereas a statute limited to
prohibiting only thefts from employee benefit funds would not."'3
The potential for uncertainty inherent in this savings provision
is substantial. May a state pass a law that would otherwise be
clearly preempted, such as a fiduciary standard, and by tacking on
a criminal penalty and making it "generally applicable" (e.g., "all
persons in a position of trust") enforce it, ERISA notwithstanding?
The savings provision for state criminal laws was needed to ensure
that otherwise illegal activity does not escape prosecution because
a state criminal law may "relate to" an employee benefit plan.
ERISA itself provides criminal sanctions for activity specifically
related to employee benefit plans. Congress decided which of these
activities it wished to subje6t to criminal sanctions and which penalties it wished to attach to these activities.2 94 Because Congress
saved only "generally applicable" state criminal laws from preemption, it is fair to conclude that it did not want the states to subject
other activities related to employee benefit plans to criminal sanctions, or to increase the sanctions that ERISA provides, unless the
particular act constitutes a crime under a state law not specifically
aimed at benefit plans.
VI.

PREEMPTION BY COLLECTIVELY-BARGAINED PLANS

Although the broad preemptive intent of section 514(a) may be
sufficient to prohibit most state regulation of employee benefit
plans, federal labor law policy may serve as another source of
preemption in this area. It is well settled that Congress intended to
provide for exclusive federal regulation of employee organizational
activity and representative selection. 2 5 Similarly, federal substantive law exclusively governs the collective bargaining process. 296 The
"' See National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914, 915-16 (D.
Conn. 1978).
"t See ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976); note 84 supra.
23 Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Plankington Packing Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950) rev'g per curiam, 255 Wis. 285,
38 N.W.2d 688 (1949); see Cox, Labor Law PreemptionRevisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1339,
1368-77 (1972).
"' International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962);
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Supreme Court held in Local 24, InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters v. Oliver 97 that the agreement reached by the parties on
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" 298
can have the force of federal law because Congress has required good
faith collective bargaining over these issues in order to effectuate the
national labor policy of promoting industrial peace.2 9 ' In Malone v.
White Motor Corp.,310 a case arising prior to the enactment of

1 White Motor Corporation argued from Oliver for giving
ERISA,31
a broad preemptive effect to collective-bargaining agreements.
On June 30, 1972, White Motor Corporation closed a manufacturing facility in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and terminated a pension
plan it had maintained for its employees there. During the course
of the litigation, in which the employees' union contended that the
plan could not be terminated until the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement on May 1, 1974, the Minnesota legislature

enacted the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act.312 The Minne-

sota Act, effective April 10, 1974, required that accrued pension
benefits of employees with ten years or more service be fully funded
on termination of a plan or closing of a place of employment, regardless of the vesting provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement.31 3 White Motor argued that since employee benefit plans have

been held to be an element of "wages, hours and other conditions
of employment," and hence a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, 34 state law provisions, such as the Minnesota Act, that
conflict with terms of a collectively-bargained employee benefit
plan are superseded.
The district court denied White Motor's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Congress had intended to permit state
substantive regulation of pension plans when it enacted WPPDA in
Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see 91 HARv. L. Rav. 887 (1978).
28 358 U.S. 283, 296-97 (1959).
23 NLRA §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1976). These are commonly referred
to as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
" Id.
§ 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1973). See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272 (1972); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
412 F. Supp. 372 (D. Minn.), rev'd, 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 497
(1978).
' Since all the events took place prior to January 1, 1975, ERISA section 514(a) was
inapplicable. 435 U.S. at 499 n.1.
3,1
Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 437 (codified at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181B.01-.17).
:m MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.04 (West Supp. 1978).
3" Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949).
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195805 and that the Minnesota Act did not operate in an area
preempted by the NLRA since it did not require the inclusion of
substantive terms in the collective-bargaining agreement.3 6 The
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that
the Minnesota Act "directly intrudes upon the employer's substantive obligations under the pension plan . . . arrived at freely
through collective bargaining" ' 7 and hence is preempted by national labor policy.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit by a four-tothree vote, holding that prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974,
Congress in passing the WPPDA had intended that the primary
responsibility for substantive regulation of pension plans lie with
the states.0 8 Given this reading of WPPDA's legislative history, the
Court determined that it could not find that the Minnesota Act was
implicitly preempted by the NLRA as affecting a collectivebargaining agreement. The Court reconciled this decision with its
earlier decision in Oliver"9 by observing that Oliver had recognized
exceptions to its general rule that states may not attempt to override substantive terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, including an exception for situations in which Congress has otherwise
indicated that the agreement of the parties may be prohibited by
state legislation.310
The Court's decision in White Motor rests on the proposition
that Congress, in enacting WPPDA, intended that the states retain
authority to regulate pension plans. That policy was reversed in
1974 by ERISA. Since the legislative underpinnings of White Motor
have been removed, state regulation of employee benefit plans may
no longer be permissible under the NLRA in light of the congressional policy inherent in section 514 of ERISA. Since the states no
longer have authority to regulate employee benefit plans under
WPPDA, they have no basis to contend that such regulation generally fits within the Oliver exception to White Motor.
The practical implications of this argument are not yet clear.
A reasonable argument exists that White Motor makes preemption
of state regulation of employee benefit plans under the NLRA generally coextensive-but merely coextensive-with preemption under
section 514 of ERISA. Under the supremacy clause, if the states
'"412 F. Supp. at 380-81.
3"

3

Id. at 379.
545 F.2d at 604.

435 U.S. at 505-08.
358 U.S. 283 (1959).
310435 U.S. at 512-14.
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remain free to act in the employee benefit area it is because Congress left some room for such action by not totally occupying the
field or because the subject matter lies beyond the reach of Congress
under the commerce clause 31 1 or falls within the scope of the tenth
amendment.312 If it is argued that Congress occupied everything it
intended to occupy and that it left nothing to the states inadvertently in the benefit plan area, then the area left to the states under
ERISA will be indistinguishable from that remaining under the
Oliver exception upon which White Motor rests.
There may, however, be some exceptions to the general impression of coextensiveness between section 514 and NLRA preemption.
For example, the Court implied in Oliver that the NLRA may not
be preemptive where a provision of a collective bargaining agreement conflicts with a local health or safety regulation.31 3 The
"health and safety" exception to Oliver remains undefined, and
lower courts have applied it with varying degrees of breadth. 4 A
situation could arise where a state "health and safety" regulation
would not be preempted by the collective bargaining agreement but
would nonetheless be superseded by section 514.
Without retreating from Congress's intent to institute broad
preemption through section 514, additional arguments relying on
federal labor law preemption could be marshalled to resist state law
encroachments on the operation and terms of employee benefit
plans that are the product of collective bargaining. While there may
be few instances where NLRA preemption exceeds ERISA preemption in this area, the presence of two comprehensive federal regulatory systems should underscore Congress's intent to preempt state
regulation of collectively bargained employee benefit plans. 315
§ 8.
312Id., amend. X; see National League of Cities v. Usery, 462 U.S. 833 (1976); text and
311 U.S. CONsT. art. I,

notes at notes 102-107 supra.
W 358 U.S. at 297.
321See, e.g., Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 201 N.W.2d

83 (1972) (exception encompasses all proper exercises of police power); United Air Lines v.
Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 211 Cal. App. 2d 729, 28 Cal. Rptr. 238, (1963) (state law prohibiting wage deductions for uniform purchases not within exception).
But see Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 1977); Time Ins. Co. v.
3,s
Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, No. 154-423, slip op. at 6-8 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 3, 1978). In Wadsworth, the First Circuit held that neither ERISA nor the NLRA
preempted a state insurance law imposing a substantive term on an employee welfare benefit
plan. See text and notes at notes 263-266 supra.The court dismissed the labor law claim with
the conclusory remark that "[s]tate regulations of group insurance policies purchased by
employee benefit plans are peripheral to any labor law other than ERISA." 562 F.2d at 79.
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LEGISLATIVE REFORM

It has been an underlying, yet recurrent theme of this article
that the statutory interpretation of ERISA's preemption provisions
could be distorted by the courts' perceived notions of desirable public policy. While the result-oriented focus of the courts may be understandable in cases such as Wayne Chemical,3 6 in which recovery
by an injured innocent beneficiary may lie in the balance, it should
be recognized that doctrinal confusion is an inevitable byproduct.
Preemption has been a topic of recurrent concern in discussions of
the implementation of ERISA and proposals for its amendment.
The most efficient method of resolving the preemption dilemmas
that have arisen under ERISA would be for Congress to address
these concerns by more clearly articulating its intended reconciliation of federal and state power in light of practical experience
under section 514.
One matter ripe for congressional review is the impact of the
Wadsworth, Old Stone Bank, and Insurers' Action Council decisions.317 The judicial construction of ERISA to permit state regulation of employee benefit plans could undermine the congressional
policy of uniform national regulation. This result could be avoided
by modifying section 514(b)(2)(B) to provide explicitly that an employee benefit plan within the definition of ERISA may not be indirectly regulated by state insurance or banking laws that regulate
another entity.
It is important that Congress, in adopting new language to
prevent the imposition of substantive terms on employee benefit
plans through state regulation, not allow a regulatory vacuum to
arise in which entrepreneurial enterprises can flourish at the expense of the public interest. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners ("NAIC") has proposed that this be accomplished
by revising the definition of "employee benefit plan" to provide
318
more clearly which parties may properly establish such a plan.
Similarly, the NAIC would revise the definition of "employee organization" to conform to the interpretation in Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Association31 1 by deleting language that includes associations organized to establish a plan, and it would revise the definition of "employer" to focus on persons that actually hire other per3
sons to produce goods or services.

"
3,7

11

567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). See text and notes at notes 163-169 supra.
See NAIC Statement, supra note 135, at 655.

3,1Id. at 673-75.
"1 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977); see text and notes at notes 151-159 supra.
3 NAIC Statement, supra note 135, at 675-76.
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A potential deficiency in the NAIC proposal, however, is that
it seeks to remedy the multiple employer trust dilemma by focusing
on the establishing parties rather than on a definition of the types
of plans that Congress intends to reserve for federal regulation. An
alternative approach would be for Congress to define clearly the sort
of employee benefit plans it wishes to be subject to ERISA, ensure
that the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service are
given adequate substantive authority to regulate those plans, and
then explicitly reserve to the states regulation of other enterprises
that are more in the nature of insurance.
The "relate to" language of section 514 is more difficult to
revise. Additional legislative provisions addressing preemption
might create more difficulties than would be resolved, since it would
be impossible to enumerate all of the potential state laws that interact with employee benefit plans or to capture them clearly in a few
general provisions. Thus, a case-by-case evolution of common-law
doctrine regarding the scope of "relate to" may be the only available
way to alleviate this problem. Congress should reiterate, however,
perhaps even in the form of an amendment, that "relate to" should
be given a broad interpretation that results in preemption except in
the most glaring cases in which state regulation involves prime state
interests and has only peripheral impact on employee benefit plans.
If courts continue to reach decisions such as Stone,3 2 in which
plans are subject to joinder in multitudinous personal and localized
causes of action, such as divorce actions, Congress must intervene
if it is to achieve its policy of uniform, national regulation of employee benefit plans. Representative John F. Seiberling of Ohio introduced a bill in 1978 to amend ERISA to provide a statutory
exception to section 206(d)(1) for alimony and child support orders
of state courts.2 2 This provision would, however, be limited in application to plan participants or beneficiaries already receiving pension benefits under a plan. Consequently, as Congressman Seiberling has explained, a court could not "use this provision to order an
early payout of pension benefits to satisfy a community property
settlement. ' '12 3 Enactment of this proposal would seem to be the
simplest and most effective way to deal with the problem.
The danger of enmeshing plans in a maze of conflicting state
322

See text and notes at notes 216-227 supra.

In H.R. 13446, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
3 Proposed Amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974:
Hearingson H.R. 13446 Before the Subcomm. on PrivatePensionPlansof the Senate Finance
Comm. and the Labor Subcomm. of the Senate Human Resources Comm., 95th Cong., 2d
Seas. (1978) (testimony of Rep. John F. Seiberling).
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laws and cases, resulting in the endless expenditure of plan assets
in suits to which the plan is in most respects a stranger, far outweighs any minor threat to the right of the states to exclusively
govern the marital relationship. Nevertheless, if policy or politics
require a retreat from preemption in this area, such a retreat should
be executed by congressional amendment, not by court decisions,
for only in that way can uniformity be preserved while the negative
impact on plans is held to a level consistent with spousal and child
support rights.
The proposed ERISA Improvements Act of 1979,34 introduced
by Senators Williams and Javits before the current session of Congress,rs is potentially a major step in this direction. The 1979 Bill,
a refinement of a similar bill introduced by Senators Williams and
Javits last year, contains provisions intended to simplify and clarify
certain aspects of ERISA,3 21 provide plan participants with additional protection against misrepresentations, 327328and consolidate
administration into one new government agency.
The 1979 Bill would help to resolve several preemption issues
discussed in this article. First, it would provide that the antialienation provision of section 206(d)(1) is not to be applied to bar judgments for alimony or child support based on benefits under an
ERISA plan, specifically including approvals of community prop3 29
erty settlements "pursuant to a State domestic relations law.
The new provision could not, however, be applied if it would require
the plan to alter its rules governing "the effective date, time, form,
'3
duration or amount of any benefit payment under the plan. 1
Second, the 1979 Bill would amend section 514(b)(2)(B) to
make it clear that
[a] State insurance law which provides that a specific benefit
or benefits must be provided or made available by a contract
or policy of insurance issued to an employee benefit plan is a
312S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Bill].

35 125 CONG. REC. 557 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 570 (remarks of Sen.
Javits).
In For example, under the 1979 Bill, supra note 324, distribution of an annual report to
plan participants would no longer be required. In its stead, plan administrators could simply
post notice that the report is on file and available on request. 1979 Bill, supra note 324, §
113.
= Id. § 154(b).
22 Id. §§ 401-404, would assign the duties relating to employee benefit plans performed
by the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation to a single newly-created Employee Benefits Commission.
In Id. § 128.
= Id.
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law which relates to an employee benefit plan within the meaning of subsection (a) and is not a law which regulates insurance
within the meaning of subparagraph (A).33
The Bill provides an exception, however, for the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Law, which was held preempted by ERISA in Standard
Oil Co. v. Agslalud, 332 and any other state law which is determined
by the Secretary of Labor to be "substantially identical to such
Hawaii law. ' ' 3 3 The 1979 Bill proposes to preempt, in the case of
such laws, only reporting and disclosure, fiduciary, and enforcment
provisions that are similar to ERISA's. On the Senate floor, Senator
Javits defended this exception as intended "to save Hawaii's program of mandatory employee health insurance which may be the
most progressive and enlightened State program of its kind in the
Nation" and "to balance the desirability of such mandatory health
insurance with the Federal interest in uniformity of regulation of
interstate employee benefit plans."' 4 The bill would give the Secretary of Labor authority to determine which plans qualify for the
exemption to "permit consistent decisionmaking and avoid conflict3 35
ing court decisions.
Third, following the Supreme Court's determination in
Daniel 5 that an employee's interest in a plan is not a security, the
1979 Bill would prohibit misrepresentations to employees about the
terms and provisions of a plan. 3 7 The Bill would not, however, permit recovery against the plan itself, and it would not alter ERISA's
reporting and disclosure requirements. 3 8 In addition, the Bill would
expressly provide that an employee's interest in a plan is not a
security for purposes of both federal and state securities law. 3 9
The 1979 Bill does not respond to all of the preemption problems discussed above, and its proposed revisions do not parallel
precisely the solutions suggested by this article. Nevertheless, by
reaffirming the general proposition that congressional amendment-not sporadic and inconsistent judicial lawmaking-is the
proper way to resolve these dilemmas, the Bill represents a positive
development toward uniform regulation of employee benefit plans.
31 Id. § 155(1).
'* See text and notes at 195-200 supra.
'3 1979 Bill, supra note 324, § 155(2).
m 125 CONG. REC. at 575 (remarks of Sen. Javits).

= Id.
3' See text and notes at notes 277-287
" 1979 Bill, supra note 324, § 154(b).
3u Id.

-' Id. § 154(a).

supra.
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CONCLUSION

Despite the considerable attention Congress gave to the question of federal preemption when it enacted ERISA, and the sweeping preemptive language it chose to adopt, the extent of the remaining state role in regulating employee benefit plans remains a source
of continuing controversy. Since one of the major aims of ERISA
was to impose a uniform regulatory scheme on employee benefit
plans throughout the nation, and since this aim was clearly and
repeatedly expressed in Congress, line-drawing questions that are
bound to arise should generally be decided in favor of preemption.
In many cases, however, courts have been moved by other policy considerations to narrow the scope of preemption, and have
responded to the issues with which they have been presented by
attempting to fashion rulings that force the judicial branch into a
posture of making legislative decisions. Although a restriction on
preemption in one particular field may not by itself undermine the
effectiveness of ERISA, the restrictions discussed in this article,
taken together, are not insignificant, and they may be only the tip
of the iceberg of preemption problems that may arise under ERISA.
Preemption has thus emerged as a fundamental area that Congress
should reconsider in reviewing the implementation and performance
of ERISA.

